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I am free, shielded from your severities, yet who am I?... I
haven't killed anyone? Not yet to be sure! But have I not let
deserving creatures die? Maybe. And maybe I am ready to do
so again.
Albert Camus1
INTRODUCTION
The 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was not a typical
armed confrontation, and it has raised a challenging set of legal
issues. On the day that Operation Allied Force bombing began,
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana claimed the moral high
ground when he stated that the goal of the bombing was to "stop
further humanitarian catastrophe."2 Yet unlike the Gulf War,
1. ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL 95 (Justin O'rien trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1971) (1956). This novel centers on a prominent lawyer whose smug, self-assured
world is shattered when he declines to save a drowning woman.
2. Transcript of March 25, 1999 Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier
Solana and SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark (last modified April 25, 1999) <httpJ//www.
nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm> [hereinafter March 25, 1999 Press Conference].
Solana also made the following points concerning the objectives and justifica-
tions for the operation:
[We are determined to continue until we have achieved our objectives: to
1684
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which also involved the use of force on behalf of fundamental
principles, the NATO bombing was not authorized by the United
Nations Security Council, leaving its legal basis unclear. From
the beginning, the NATO Secretary-General was careful to avoid
explicitly invoking a right of humanitarian intervention as the
legal justification for the mission,3 and officials in the United
States and other NATO countries followed suit. At the same
time, NATO leaders made it clear that the moral and political
justification for the mission was humanitarian,4 and no alterna-
tive legal justification has been offered so far.5 Not surprisingly,
halt the violence and to stop further humanitarian catastrophe. Let me
emphasise once again that we have no quarrel with the people of Yugo-
slavia. Our actions are directed against the repressive policies of the
Yugoslav government, which is refusing to respect civilized norms of
behaviour in this Europe at the end of the 20th century. The responsi-
bility for the current crisis rests with President Milosevic. It is up to
him to comply with the demands of the international community.
Id.
3. During the March 25 news conference, the Secretary-General stated:
[T]he NATO countries think that this action is perfectly legitimate and it
is within the logic of the UN Security Council and therefore that is why
we are engaged in this operation in order not to wage war against any-
body but to try to stop the war and to guarantee that peace is a reality
for a country that has been suffering from war for many, many years.
Id.
4. At the Berlin Summit of the European Union, only days after the NATO
bombing had begun, European leaders defended it in moral, humanitarian, and polit-
ical terms:'
[Tihe Prime Minister [Tony Blair] said the Western alliance was taking
action "for one very simple reason-to damage Serb forces sufficiently to
prevent Milosevic from continuing to perpetuate his vile oppression
against innocent Albanian civilians..... Gerhard Schroder, the German
Chancellor and first German leader to authorise military action since
1945, went on national television saying NATO stood ready "to defend
the common, basic values of freedom, democracy and human rights. We
cannot allow these values to be trampled under foot less than an hour's
flight from us.... Our determination to end the killing in Kosovo is
beyond doubt." The French President, Jacques Chirac, said the air at-
tacks were launched to defend 'peace on our soil, peace in Europe."
Stephen Castle & Colin Brown, Serbia Offensive: 'Barbaric' Milosevic Must Take the
Blame, INDEP. (London), Mar. 25, 1999, at 2, available in 1999 WL 5990539.
5. As he argued before the U.N. General Assembly that the NATO bombing was
appropriate, President Clinton seemed rather apologetic in noting that "[iun the real
world, principles often collide and tough choices must be made." President William
Jefferson Clinton, Speech to the 54th United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 21,
1999), in FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 21, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fed-
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commentators have raised questions concerning the legality of
humanitarian intervention despite NATO's careful attempts to
skirt the issue.
This Essay argues that, under an appropriate and narrowly
defined set of circumstances, acts of forcible humanitarian inter-
vention can indeed be legal, even without the authorization of
the Security Council. The principal focus, however, is on the
task facing the United States and NATO now that they have
invoked this controversial doctrine.6 Those who rely upon the
right of humanitarian intervention have a responsibility to de-
fine its legal parameters. Indeed, when a vague doctrine can be
invoked by states to justify the use of force, it offers them a
license that is subject to abuse. This justification for the use of
force is inherently threatening to other states, particularly when
those states claiming this license are the most powerful states in
the international community. Without clear legal standards to
limit it, the practice of humanitarian intervention threatens to
undermine the friendly relations among states and could have
an adverse impact upon international peace and security.
This Essay uses the term "humanitarian intervention"7 nar-
rowly to refer to forcible action by a state on the territory of
eral News Service File. He went on to state:
Even in Kosovo, NATO's actions followed a clear consensus, expressed in
several Security Council resolutions, that the atrocities committed by
Serb forces were unacceptable, that the international community had a
compelling interest in seeing them end. Had we chosen to do nothing in
the face of this brutality, I do not believe we would have strengthened
the United Nations. Instead, we would have risked discrediting every-
thing it stands for. By acting as we did, we helped to vindicate the
principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter, to give the U.N. the oppor-
tunity it now has to play the central role in shaping Kosovo's fu-
ture .... The outcome in Kosovo is hopeful.
Id.
6. Although the NATO countries have been reluctant to invoke humanitarian
intervention as a legal justification for their intervention, they have invoked the doc-
trine in their political rhetoric. See, e.g., infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text
(discussing the "Clinton Doctrine").
7. Ian Brownlie defined "humanitarian intervention" as the "Threat or use of
armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an international organization,
with the object of protecting human rights. It must be emphasized that this usage
begs the question of legality and stresses function or objective." Ian Brownlie, Hu-
manitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John
Norton Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter LAW AND CIVIL WAR].
1686
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another to protect individuals from continuing grave violations
of fundamental human rights.8 Cases in which the Security
Council or local government authorizes the use of force are ex-
cluded from this definition because their legality can be estab-
lished independently of any right of humanitarian intervention.9
In most scenarios of humanitarian intervention,0 the territorial
state's government either is directly responsible for the viola-
tions or has acquiesced in them."
Although NATO has relied, at least implicitly, upon a right of
humanitarian intervention, serious doubts remain regarding
both the status of this right under international law and the
conditions that would necessarily have to limit it. This confusion
stems from the tension between two key aspects of the post-
World War II international legal order.
A strict prohibition on the use of force was incorporated into
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter12 as the cornerstone of its strategy
8. Fernando Tes6n defines humanitarian intervention as "the proportionate
transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in
another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be
rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government." FERNANDO R. TES6N,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 5 (2d ed. 1997).
This definition incorporates much of his test for determining when humanitarian
intervention is legal. See id.
9. Arend and Beck endorse similar criteria, excluding from the scope of humani-
tarian intervention any action authorized by the Security Council as well as any
action taken pursuant to the invitation of the territorial state. See ANTHONY CLARK
AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 128-29
(1993).
10. An exception would exist where a weak or nonexistent national government,
not complicit in the violations, was unable to stop the violations and yet would not
request any outside assistance.
11. David Scheffer identifies a classical definition of humanitarian intervention,
although he does not endorse it:
The classical definition of "humanitarian intervention" is limited to those
instances in which a nation unilaterally uses military force to intervene
in the territory of another state for the purpose of protecting a sizable
group of indigenous people from life-threatening or otherwise unconsciona-
ble infractions of their human rights that the national government inflicts
or in which it acquiesces.
David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U.
TOL. L. REV. 253, 264 (1992).
12. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N.
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for promoting order and peace in the international system. 13 The
Charter recognizes only two exceptions to this prohibition. The
first is that force may be used in self-defense. 14 The second ex-
ception applies only when a decision of the Security Council
authorizes the use of force to protect or maintain international
peace and security.'5 The prohibition, like other parts of the
Charter, 6 reinforces the sovereign rights of the state. The Char-
ter also affirms that the United Nations itself lacks the authority
to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of its members. 17 These
provisions support the view that state sovereignty should pre-
clude any intrusive international action for the protection of
human rights.
On the other hand, the Charter also heralds the emergence of
a new international law of human rights that fundamentally
challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty.'8 The Charter
CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
13. Yoram Dinstein takes note of this overall strategy when he stresses that Arti-
cle 2(4) of the Charter must be read in conjunction with Article 2(3), which pre-
scribes that "[aill members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered." YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 85-86 (1994).
14. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
15. Chapter VII of the Charter states that, "The Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
16. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (stating that "[tihe Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members").
17.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
18. Michael Reisman argues that international human rights norms are "constitu-
tive norms" in that they imply a radical and qualitative change in international law
as a whole. Thus, he sees the need for a process that might be referred to as the
"updating contemporization" or actualization of international norms in light of human
rights norms. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 866, 873 (1990). He also asserts that
"[p]recisely because the human rights norms are constitutive, other norms must be
reinterpreted in their light." Id.
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states that promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
is one of the basic purposes of the United Nations.' 9 Based on
this language, human rights have become a matter of interna-
tional concern and not merely a question within the domestic
jurisdiction of states. The concept of an international law of
human rights derogates from the absolute concept of state sover-
eignty and marks a radical departure from the traditional
"state-centric" view of international law.2°
When the Security Council fails to act to stop a continuing
humanitarian crisis, these two basic pillars of the post-World
War II legal order come into dramatic conflict.21 Humanitarian
19. See U.N. CHARTER preamble; id. art. 1, para. 3; id. art. 55.
20. The development of international law is still deeply constrained by its "state-
centric" origins:
According to the prevailing positivist conception of international law, that
law derives its binding force from the consent of sovereign states ...
This is one important sense in which international law is centered on
states, or "state-centric." In addition, international law was traditionally
thought to create rights and obligations only for states. According to this
view international law was a law by and for states, in which the rights
of individuals had no place.
An important step beyond state-centrism is implicit in the idea of an
international law of human rights, since the rights concerned are those of
individuals, or groups of individuals rather than those of states. The very
concept of internationally recognized human rights is in derogation of
state sovereignty, while traditional "state-centric' approaches to interna-
tional law insist upon a very broad definition of state sovereignty and a
formalistic defense of it from any external intrusion. This traditional
concept of international law is inherently inadequate to the task of pro-
tecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms which the UN sys-
tem is pledged to promote.
Bartram S. Brown, The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating States: A New
Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 203, 204 (1992).
21. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has defined the dilemma of humanitarian
intervention in the following terms:
The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the consequences of
inaction can be in the face of mass murder. But this year's conflict in
Kosovo raised equally important questions about the consequences of
action without international consensus and clear legal authority.
It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of so-called "humanitarian
intervention." On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional
organisation to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it
permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with
grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? The inability of
the international community to reconcile these two compelling interests in
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1683
intervention may be the only way to protect innocent civilian
victims from genocide and ethnic cleansing, but recognition of
such a right threatens to disable the basic peace strategy of the
Charter by undermining the prohibition on the use of force. 2
The question of whether forcible humanitarian intervention can
ever be considered legal without the authorization of the Security
Council therefore remains, and the debate on this issue contin-
ues. Regardless of the status of humanitarian intervention un-
der current law, the use of force to assist the Kosovar Albanians
has reopened consideration of this issue.
The United States and NATO may not have explicitly claimed
a right of humanitarian intervention, but in bombing Yugoslavia
they have exercised a prerogative that seems both radical and
unprincipled to many outside observers.23 They can and should
remedy this situation by clarifying the limits to the right of
humanitarian intervention, which they have effectively claimed.
Military action to aid the Kosovar Albanians was the right thing
to do, but it is unacceptable that no clear legal justification for
that operation has been offered.
NATO countries, which generally base their governments
upon respect for the rule of law, have in the past been instru-
mental in clarifying the rules of international law governing war
and the use of force.24 They should follow that example now by
the case of Kosovo can be viewed only as a tragedy.
Kofi A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49.
22. In commenting on this issue, Louis Henkin has noted:
Violations of human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were
permissible to remedy them by external use of force, there would be no
law to forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any
other. Human rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other
injustices remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the door to
aggression and destroying the principal advance in international law, the
outlawing of war and the prohibition of force.
Louis HENKiN, How NATIONs BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 145 (2d ed. 1979).
23. Speaking about how much of the rest of the world reacted to the Kosovo mission,
one commentator noted: "[For the millions, or billions, who directly or indirectly wit-
nessed the Kosovo campaign, it provided a terrifying display of what seemed unac-
countable power in the service not of humanity, but merely of the United States and
its allies." William Pfaff, Luck Enabled NATO to Win Its Anti-heroic War, INTL HER-
ALD TRIB., July 8, 1999, at 8, available in 1999 WL 5112407.
24. See infra notes 93-135 and accompanying text.
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leading efforts to codify the law of humanitarian intervention as
it is emerging at the dawn of the twenty-first century.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCTRINES
A. Emerging Outlines of the Clinton Doctrine
The first basic statement of the policy sometimes referred to
as the "Clinton Doctrine" came in a speech President Clinton
gave to K.F.O.R. troops in Macedonia in June 1999. In, this
speech, President Clinton noted:
So the whole credibility of the principle on which we have
stood our ground and fought in this region for years and
years now-that here, just like in America, just like in Great
Britain, people who come from different racial and ethnic and
religious backgrounds can live together and work together
and do better together if they simply respect each other's
God-given dignity-and we don't want our children to grow
up in a 21st century world where innocent civilians can be
hauled off to the slaughter, where children can die en masse,
where young boys of military age can be burned alive, where
young girls can be raped en masse just to intimidate their
families-we don't want our kids to grow up in a world like
that....
It is not free of danger, it will not be free of difficulty.
There will be some days you wish you were somewhere else.
But never forget if we can do this here, and if we can then
say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or
Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after
innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of
their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it's
within our power to stop it, we will stop it.'
The President later confirmed that, in his view, a new
"Clinton Doctrine" was emerging. 6 The scope and applicability
25. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the KFOR Troops, in U.S.
NEWSWIRE, June 22, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group All File.
26. President Clinton seemed to confirm that there was a "Clinton Doctrine" when
asked directly about the matter by Wolf Blitzer of CNN:
Q: Mr. President, some of your aides are now talking about a Clinton
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of the doctrine clearly needs further elucidation, but some of
the general outlines have begun to emerge. National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger has identified three criteria for the appli-
cation of this new policy: first, there must be genocide or ethnic
cleansing; second, the United States must have the capacity to
act; and third, the United States must have a national interest
at stake." Despite the sweeping language of the President's
initial statement, it is clear that the United States is not com-
mitting itself to intervene in every situation.28 At best, humani-
doctrine in foreign policy in the aftermath of this war against Yugoslavia.
Is there, in your mind, a Clinton doctrine?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think there's an important principle here that
I hope will be now upheld in the future and not just by the United
States, not just by NATO, but also by the leading countries of the world,
through the United Nations. And that is that while there may well be a
great deal of ethnic and religious conflict in the world-some of it might
break out into wars-that whether within or beyond the borders of a
country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we ought to
stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. People ought-innocent civilians ought
not to be subject to slaughter because of their religious or ethnic or ra-
cial or tribal heritage.
That is what we did, but took too long in doing, in Bosnia. That is
what we did, and are doing, in Kosovo. That is, frankly, what we failed
to do in Rwanda, where so many died so quickly-and what I hope very
much weql be able to do in Africa, if it ever happens there again.
Interview with Wolf Blitzer of Cable News Network's "Late Edition" in Cologne, 35
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1143, 1146 (June 20, 1999).
27. When National Security Advisor Sandy Berger was asked if there is a Clinton
Doctrine, he replied:
I instinctively resist doctrine, but I think it is a principle that we
have established in Kosovo: There are some activities that governments
engage in, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, that we cannot ignore.
That doesn't necessarily mean we have a military response in every situ-
ation. We have to have the capacity to act, as the president has indicated.
In Kosovo, we had a national interest as well: 1.8 million refugees
awash in Southeastern Europe is inherently unstable. There's no question
in my mind that it would have destabilized Albania, Macedonia, perhaps
Hungary, and we would have had a wider war in Europe. We would
have been faced with a bigger mess that we would have had to deal
with later this year or next year. Where there is genocide or ethnic
cleansing, where we have the capacity to act as we did here with NATO,
where we have a national interest, I believe we should act.
Doyle McManus, Samuel Berger: In a Domestic President's Foreign Service, a Mid-
dleman Emerges, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1999, at M3.
28. In his address to the United Nations a few months after the NATO bombing,
President Clinton stressed that states would evaluate their own national interests in
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tarian intervention will remain an extraordinary practice to be
used only in special cases.
B. Foreign Policy Doctrines and International Law
The Kosovo bombing has raised not only an issue of U.S. for-
eign policy, but also a very fundamental issue of public interna-
tional law. The viability of the Clinton Doctrine as a long-term
U.S. policy may be largely determined by domestic political con-
siderations in this country,9 but the rules of international law
governing humanitarian intervention cannot be determined
unilaterally by the United States or even by all the NATO states
together. That being said, the United States can and should take
the lead in clarifying this area of law for the future.
The idea of a "Clinton Doctrine" can best be appreciated in the
context of the many foreign policy doctrines that preceded it.
The best known of all U.S. foreign policy doctrines is the Monroe
Doctrine. In 1823, U.S. President James Monroe declared to the
European powers that the United States would treat any
deciding when and where to intervene. Specifically, President Clinton commented:
[Tihe way the international community responds will depend upon the
capacity of countries to act and on their perception of their national
interests. NATO acted in Kosovo, for example, to stop a vicious campaign
of ethnic cleansing in a place where we had important interests at stake
and the ability to act collectively. The same consideration brought Ni-
gerian troops and their partners to Sierra Leone and Australians and
others to East Timor. That is proper so long as we work together, sup-
port each other, and do not abdicate our collective responsibility.
I know that some are troubled that the United States and others
cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world. We can-
not do everything everywhere.
Clinton, supra note 5.
29. It remains to be seen whether NATO's Kosovo policy and President Clinton's
words will achieve lasting status even as political doctrine. Public opinion in the
United States will be a major factor because a politically unpopular doctrine will not
be sustainable. In this sense, the results of the next presidential election will be
quite important. If the next U.S. President endorses a version of this doctrine, it
will have a much stronger chance of becoming established. The doctrine, however,
may be finished if the next President rejects it. See, e.g., Francine Kiefer, Clinton
Doctrine': Is It Substance or Spin?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 28, 1999, § USA,
at 2. Kiefer asks rhetorically, "does this post-cold-war tenet have staying power? Will
it influence future leaders? Or is it, as former Clinton Chief of staff Leon Panetta
worries, just another 'message of the day' churned out by the White House spin
machine?" Id.
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reextension of European colonial power into the Americas as a
threat to the interests of the United States."° This doctrine was
articulated as a statement of U.S. interests and policy and did
not purport to represent a statement of international law, 1 but
it served to shield the newly independent Latin American states
from European interference. The Monroe Doctrine has developed
into a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Almost a century later,
President Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the Monroe Doc-
trine claimed for the United States the right to intervene in the
internal affairs of Latin American states. 2 Political doctrines
come and go, and they can serve to promote international law,
as did the Truman Doctrine,33 or to undermine it, as did the
30. In the words of President Monroe:
With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we
have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments
who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose
independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles,
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of op-
pressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any
European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an un-
friendly disposition toward the United States.
President James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823), in 2
JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 218 (1896).
31. Far from being law, Hans J. Morgenthau characterized the Monroe Doctrine as
a form of "localized imperialism." HANS MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 70 (6th ed. 1985).
32. See id. at 26.
33. President Truman launched the Truman Doctrine in 1947 when he spoke of
the need to aid free peoples resisting communist subversion:
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free
one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distin-
guished by free institutions, representative government, free elections,
guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and
freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a con-
trolled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal
freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures.
20001 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT A CROSSROADS 1695
Roosevelt corollary. Depending upon how clearly and honestly it
is defined, a Clinton Doctrine of humanitarian intervention
might fall into either category.
The counterintervention policy, sometimes referred to as the
"Reagan Doctrine," stopped far short of armed humanitarian
intervention, although it too was based on claims of moral legiti-
macy.' Supporters of the Reagan Doctrine were careful to dis-
tinguish it from the discredited Brezhnev Doctrine." Nonethe-
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own
destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and
financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political
processes.
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we
cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the
United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as
political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain
their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations....
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want.
They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach
their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.
We must keep that hope alive.
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining
their freedoms.
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the
world-and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation.
President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey.
The Truman Doctrine, PUB. PAPERS 176, 178-80 (1963).
34. Jeane Kirkpatrick has described this doctrine as follows:
The Reagan Doctrine, as we understand it, is above all concerned with
the moral legitimacy of U.S. support-including military support-for
insurgencies under certain circumstances: where there are indigenous
opponents to a government that is maintained by force, rather than pop-
ular consent; where such a government depends on arms supplied by the
Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, or other foreign sources; and where the
people are denied a choice regarding their affiliations and future. The
Reagan Doctrine supports the traditional American doctrine that armed
revolt is justified as a last resort where rights of citizens are systemati-
cally violated. This view is, of course, stated clearly in the Declaration of
Independence, which insists that legitimate government depends on the
consent of the governed.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and
International Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
20-21 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter RIGHT V. MIGHT].
35. Kirkpatrick and Gerson further noted:
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less, the legitimacy ,of the Reagan Doctrine was questioned of-
ten, 6 especially after the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
condemned U.S. support of the Nicaraguan Contras in the Nica-
ragua decision. In that decision, the ICJ concluded, on the basis
of customary international law, 7 that United States military
and paramilitary activities in support of the Contras constituted
an illegal intervention, an illegal use of force, and a violation of
Nicaragua's territorial sovereignty.3 s Presidents generally formu-
The charge that the Reagan Doctrine comes close to being interchange-
able with the Soviet doctrine of national liberation is baseless. The latter
countenances expansion of Soviet power. The Reagan Doctrine permits
assistance in self-defense. The Brezhnev Doctrine preserves foreign influ-
ence. The Reagan Doctrine restores self-government. It countenances
counter-intervention, not intervention. The Reagan Doctrine is not a "roll-
back," but it is a cousin to that idea.
Id. at 31.
36. Louis Henkin made the following critical observations:
Whatever its domestic appeal, the "Reagan policy" as commonly under-
stood, is untenable in law, and the United States cannot lawfully pursue
it. It may be permissible to intervene by limited force strictly for the
purpose of protecting and liberating hostages when the territorial state is
unable or unwilling to protect or liberate them; it is not permissible to
overthrow a government to that end-as Vietnam did in Cambodia, and
the United States in Grenada .... It is not permissible under the Char-
ter to use force to impose or secure democracy;, nor does the Charter
contain a Monroe Doctrine exception that would permit the United States
to use force to keep the Western Hemisphere free of communism. In the
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice rejected the "Reagan
policy," as it had the Brezhnev Doctrine.
Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra
note 34, at 37-56.
37. Jurisdictional limitations precluded the ICJ from applying the U.N. Charter
and other multilateral treaties. The ICJ therefore based its entire decision upon the
application of customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97 (June 27). Some commentators strongly criticized
this jurisdictional aspect of the decision. For example, John Norton Moore commented:
The majority of the Court was also wrong in assuming jurisdiction in
this case. Once the majority admitted that the U.S. multilateral treaty
reservation was applicable, as it did, the ineluctable conclusion was that
the Court had no jurisdiction. The majority's subsequent effort to exercise
jurisdiction in the face of such a manifest absence of jurisdiction is a
classic example of excus de pouvoir, depriving the opinion of any legal
effect.
John Norton Moore, The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order, 81
AM. J. INTL L. 151, 155 (1987).
38. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 146-47.
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late foreign policy doctrines based upon considerations of the na-
tional interest, but when these doctrines involve the use of force,
issues of international law are also relevant.
II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Debating the legality of humanitarian intervention is difficult
because to do so involves setting priorities between different
rules and principles of international law. The conflict between
the values of state sovereignty and human rights is a familiar
one, but any discussion of humanitarian intervention must also
try to reconcile two types of human rights: those of the victims
one might hope to protect through intervention on the one hand,
and the collective human right of self-determination, which is a
corollary of the principle of nonintervention, on the other.3 9
When a state asserts its right to be free from foreign interven-
tion, it may claim, at least in part, to be asserting the collective
right of its people to determine their own political destiny.
A. The Case for a Limited Right of Humanitarian Intervention
The argument for humanitarian intervention assumes that, at
least in appropriate cases, the protection of human rights is a
higher priority than the defense of national sovereignty from
armed intrusion. It follows that when the human rights situa-
tion is serious enough, the proportionate use of armed force to
remedy this problem should be legal. Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter prohibits the use of force only "against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."4 °
It therefore can be argued that the Charter allows the use of
force to halt massive violations of human rights, as long as the
prohibited purposes listed are not also involved.4 ' This approach
is particularly attractive from the humanitarian perspective
insofar as it might help to remedy the inability of international
39. See R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115 (1986).
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
41. Dinstein notes that "[there is admittedly strong doctrinal support" for this
approach. DINSTEIN, supra note 13, at 89.
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law and institutions to take action against even the most serious
international crimes, such as genocide.
The rules prohibiting genocide and crimes against humanity
are peremptory norms from which, in theory at least, no deroga-
tion is permitted.42 What then is to be done when widespread
violations occur and the territorial state is either unwilling or
unable to prevent them? If diplomatic initiatives fail, military
intervention may be the only way to prevent the continuing
slaughter of innocents.
There is some authority for the view that customary interna-
tional law had recognized a right of humanitarian intervention
before the U.N. Charter.43 If so, why should the Charter, which
was supposed to be a step forward for human rights, be allowed
to reduce the options available for the vindication of those
rights? Under the Charter, armed action to protect human rights
could be authorized by decision of the Security Council." This
theoretical possibility, however, is not enough to fulfill the
promise of international human rights. From the humanitarian
perspective, the critical issue is whether the Charter regime pro-
vides an adequate Security Council response to critical humani-
tarian situations.
The view that the Charter provides an adequate response
suffers from a "credibility gap"45 because the Charter has failed
to deliver on its promise46 to provide a multilateral solution to
42. These prohibitions may have achieved the status of jus cogens, that is, the
most peremptory norms of international law from which no derogation is permitted.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (5th ed. 1998).
43. Tes6n concludes "that there is considerable authority for the proposition that
the right of humanitarian intervention was a rule of customary [international] law
prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter." TES6N, supra note 8, at 155;
see also IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338
(1963) ("By the end of the nineteenth century the majority of publicists admitted
that a right of humanitarian intervention . . . existed.").
44. The Security Council can authorize the use of force if it deems this necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-
42.
45. "[E]vents during the past decade reveal a widening 'credibility gap' between
the absolute non-intervention approach to the Charter ... and the actual practice of
states." Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and
a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR, supra note 7, at 229,
248.
46. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has criticized the Security Council's failure
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serious international problems.47 One author, who concedes that
the Charter was intended to prohibit humanitarian intervention,
has argued that the failure of the Charter regime to operate in
practice now justifies a "realistic" interpretation recognizing
humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition on
the use of force.4"
B. The Case Against Humanitarian Intervention
The legal case against recognition of even a conditional legal
right of humanitarian intervention is easily made. It begins with
to uphold its responsibilities under the U.N. Charter and lamented a possible loss of
the United Nation's credibility. He has stated:
[I]n cases where forceful intervention does become necessary, the
Security Council-the body charged with authorising the use of force
under international law-must be able to rise to the challenge. The
choice must not be between council unity and inaction in the face of
genocide-as in the case of Rwanda-and council division, but regional
action, as in the case of Kosovo. In both cases, the UN should have been
able to find common ground in upholding the principles of the charter,
and acting in defence of our common humanity.
As important as the council's enforcement power is its deterrent
power, and unless it is able to assert itself collectively where the cause
is just and the means available, its credibility in the eyes of the world
may well suffer. If states bent on criminal behaviour know that frontiers
are not an absolute defence-that the council will take action to halt the
gravest crimes against humanity-then they will not embark on such a
course assuming they can get away with it. The charter requires the
council to be the defender of the "common interest." Unless it is seen to
be so--in an era of human rights, interdependence and globalisation
-there is a danger that others will seek to take its place.
Annan, supra note 21, at 50.
47. As Wolfgang Friedmann put it, "the inability of the UN, as at present
organised, to act swiftly has handed the power of decision back to the national
states." WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
259 (1964).
48.
The argument against a right of humanitarian intervention is based
primarily on an absolute interpretation of the article 2(4) prohibition on
the use of force and the fear of abusive invocation of the doctrine. The
reality of current state practice, however, has rendered the absolute pro-
hibition of the Charter meaningless. Thus, there exists a compelling need
for a contemporary and realistic interpretation of article 2(4) based on
state practice that recognizes an exception to the Charter prohibition
when force is required to prevent mass slaughter.
Daniel Wolf, Humanitarian Intervention, 9 MICH. Y.B. INTL LEGAL STUD. 333, 368
(1988).
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the principle of nonintervention,49 which generally bars forcible
intervention by one state upon the territory of another.50 The
right of self-defense and, occasionally, the right of reprisal have
been recognized as exceptions to this prohibition, but claims to a
right of humanitarian intervention have never achieved the
same degree of acceptance by the international community.
The U.N. Charter codifies a new and stricter regime limiting
the use of force. It prohibits the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of states5' and
recognizes only the two exceptions discussed above.52 The Char-
ter does not recognize any right to use force to protect human
rights," except insofar as this may be decided upon and autho-
rized by the Security Council. Regional action is no exception to
this rule. Article 53(1) of the Charter specifically provides that
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrange-
ments or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council."54 Even the right of reprisal, which had
achieved general acceptance prior to the creation of the United
Nations, 5 has only a doubtful status under the Charter regime.
Then there is the problem of authorizing a multilateral hu-
manitarian action. The U.N. Charter is based on a universal
vision shared by its founders: a vision of a peaceful and stable
49. As Brownlie notes, "a state using force on the territory of another, without the
license of the effective government, has a burden of justification to discharge, since
it is presumptively a trespasser." Brownlie, supra note 7, at 221.
50. The International Court of Justice has condemned intervention in the following
terms:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the mani-
festation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most
serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in
international organization, find a place in international law .... Between
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential
foundation of international relations.
Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).
51. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
53. "[It is extremely doubtful if this form of intervention has survived the express
condemnations of intervention which have occurred in recent times or the general
prohibition of resort to force to be found in the United Nations Charter." BROWNLIE,
supra note 43, at 342 (footnote omitted).
54. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
55. See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
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world that they hoped to achieve. The basic peace strategy of the
Charter was to prohibit the use of force by states and to entrust
responsibility for international peace and security to the Security
Council.5" Unfortunately, the Security Council can fulfill this
responsibility only when there is a consensus for action among
its permanent members.
Many commentators and states have rejected the idea that in-
ternational law permits humanitarian intervention without the
authorization of the Security Council. As recently as 1986, an
official policy statement of the British Foreign Office found little
evidence of state practice supporting a right of humanitarian
intervention and strong reasons to reject any move towards
recognition of such a right. The British Foreign Office stated:
[The overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion
comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian
intervention, for three main reasons: first, the UN Charter
and the corpus of modem international law do not seem spe-
cifically to incorporate such a right; secondly, state practice
in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best
provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian
intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and
finally, on prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing
such a right argues strongly against its creation.... In es-
sence, therefore, the case against making humanitarian inter-
vention an exception to the principle of non-intervention is
that its doubtful benefits would be heavily outweighed by its
costs in terms of respect for international law. 8
56. In commenting on the basic strategy of the U.N. Charter, Oscar Schachter has
noted:
When the United Nations (UN) Charter was adopted, it was generally
considered to have outlawed war. States accepted the obligation to settle
all disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of
use of force in their international relations. . . . These provisions were
seen by most observers as the heart of the Charter and the most impor-
tant principles of contemporary international law.
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1620 (1984).
57. For example, Ian Brownlie has noted, "[i]t is clear to the present writer that a
jurist asserting a right of forcible humanitarian intervention has a very heavy bur-
den of proof. Few writers familiar with the modern materials of state practice and
legal opinion on the use of force would support such a view." Brownlie, supra note
7, at 218.
58. United Kingdom Foreign Policy Document No. 148, 57 BRITIsH Y.B. INTIL L.
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Many small, militarily weak, nondemocratic or nonwestern
states are concerned that they might be potential targets of
humanitarian intervention. These states tend to believe that
their sovereignty depends upon a strict interpretation of Article
2(4), which precludes any possibility of humanitarian interven-
tion without the authorization of the Security Council.59 Human-
itarian intervention is controversial not only due to doubts about
its legality, but also because there are usually so many unan-
swered questions concerning the popular will of the local people,
the level of atrocities that warrant intervention, and the possible
ulterior motives of the intervening state.60 Reisman notes that
"[tihe most satisfactory solution to this problem is the creation of
centralized institutions, equipped with decision-making authority
and the capacity to make it effective." Although new and im-
proved international institutions may not be on the horizon,62
the Security Council has at times acted more assertively and
effectively since the end of the Cold War.6"
614, 619 (1986) [hereinafter Foreign Policy Document No. 1481.
59. As Schachter notes:
Many governments attach importance to the principle that any forcible
incursion into the territory of another State is a derogation of that
State's territorial sovereignty and political independence, irrespective of the
motive for such intervention or its long-term consequences. Accordingly,
they tend to hold to the sweeping prohibition of Article 2(4) against the
use or threat of force except where self-defense or Security Council en-
forcement action is involved.
Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public
International Law, in 178 RECUtEIL DES COUPS [COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 8, 148 (1982-V) (1985).
60. See Foreign Policy Document No. 148, supra note 58, at 618-19; Reisman,
supra note 18, at 875.
61. Reisman, supra note 18, at 875.
62. One new institution is on the horizon. A treaty to establish an International
Criminal Court was negotiated in Rome in the summer of 1998. The new court
requires ratification of the treaty by sixty countries. See ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183, at 9 (1998) (reissued for
technical reasons) [hereinafter ROME STATUTE].
63. Mary Ellen O'Connell argues that the Security Council has already ended its
experiment with humanitarian intervention:
For a short while, from 1991 until 1994, it appeared that a majority of
Security Council members had re-interpreted the Charter's order of priori-
ties. To some, it seemed that the Council had placed such values as
human rights, self-determination, and even democracy above the value of
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C. Legal Justifications Given in Practice for Forcible Acts of
Humanitarian Intervention
Since the U.N. Charter entered into force, there have been
several cases in which armed intervention has been used for
arguably humanitarian purposes." The intervening power has
not relied legally upon a right of humanitarian intervention in
any of these cases.65 Rather, in most such cases, the intervening
state invoked the right of self-defense and claimed that it pro-
vided the legal authority for the state's actions. Louis Henkin
cites the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport in Uganda as the
"paradigmatic" case of humanitarian intervention.66 In the con-
text of that incident, however, the Israeli government avoided
reliance upon this doctrine, arguing instead that the military
operation to protect Israeli nationals was justified as an act of
self-defense.67 Given the general doubts regarding the legality of
humanitarian intervention, a state's use of force to protect its
own nationals has been easier to justify as an exercise of the
peace through respect for State autonomy. A careful examination does not
support the conclusion that the Security Council accomplished a real re-
ordering. However, to the extent that Security Council members may
have moved away from the traditional interpretation of the Charter, . . .
they have now returned. The experiment with re-ordering priorities has
ended. Peace through respect for State autonomy has again, for better or
worse, returned as the primary value.
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continu-
ing Importance of State Autonomy, 36 COLUMI. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 473-74, 488-89
(1997) (footnote omitted).
64. Several such cases are catalogued in AREND & BECK, supra note 9, at 114-28,
and TES6N, supra note 8, at 155-200.
65. As one study of this state practice explains:
To be sure, when taking up arms, intervening states have often de-
nounced large-scale violations of human rights in their target states: for
example in East Pakistan, Kampuchea, Uganda, and Grenada. Neverthe-
less, they have almost invariably taken care not to submit explicit "hu-
manitarian intervention" justifications for their recourses to armed force.
AREND & BECK, supra note 9, at 129.
66. Henkin, supra note 36, at 41.
67. During the Security Council debate relating to the Israeli raid on Entebbe,
representatives of both Israel and the United States argued that because the hostages
were Israeli nationals, Israel's use of force was justified as an exercise of the right
to self-defense. See Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the
Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the Entebbe Airport, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939,
at 51-59 (July 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1224, at 1228-31 (Sept. 1976).
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right of self-defense. 68 Even in the rare cases of military inter-
vention to protect the human rights of nonnationals, such as the
Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 197169 and Tanzania's inva-
sion of Uganda in 1979,70 the intervening states preferred to rely
upon the more established right of self-defense.71
When the United States, United Kingdom, and France estab-
lished "no-fly" zones in northern and southern Iraq, they claimed
that the action was for the humanitarian purpose of protecting
the Kurdish and the Shiite minorities from repression; the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention, however, was never invoked
69. The late Wolfgang Friedmann wrote of "[tihe conditions under which a state
may be entitled, as an aspect of self-defense, to intervene in another state, in order
to protect its nationals from injury.. . ." Wolfgang Friedmann, United States Policy
and the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM. J. INTL L. 857, 867 n.10 (1965). More
recently, Oscar Schachter noted:
Reliance on self-defence as a legal ground for protecting nationals in
emergency situations of peril probably reflects a reluctance to rely solely
on the argument of humanitarian intervention as an exception to Article
2(4) or on the related point that such intervention is not 'against the
territorial integrity or political independence' of the territorial State and
that it is not inconsistent with the Charter.
Schachter, supra note 59, at 148.
69. Fernando Tes6n sees the Indian intervention in East Pakistan as a good ex-
ample of humanitarian intervention. He argues that "[hiumanitarian intervention is
the best interpretation we can provide for the Bangladesh war. That reading puts
the incident in its best light under both principles of international law and elemen-
tary moral commitments to human dignity." TES6N, supra note 8, at 208. His claim
that "India did articulate humanitarian reasons as justification for her military ac-
tion" focuses only on India's statement of its motive for intervention. Id. at 207. He
cites no evidence that India invoked humanitarian intervention as a legal justifica-
tion. See id.
70. Thousands of Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda in 1979. This invasion mark-
edly improved the human rights situation in Uganda. This was accomplished, however,
by completely replacing the unspeakably brutal regime of Idi Amin. This broader
political objective would be difficult to justify under a right of humanitarian inter-
vention. For more discussion of the need to avoid pretextual interventions, see infra
notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
71. According to the British Foreign Office:
The two most discussed instances of alleged humanitarian intervention
since 1945 are the Indian invasion of Bangladesh in 1971 and Tanzania's
"humanitarian" invasion of Uganda in 1979. But, although both did result
in unquestionable benefits ... [India and Tanzania] were reluctant to
use humanitarian ends to justify their invasion of a neighbour's territory.
Both preferred to quote the right to self-defence under Article 51.
Foreign Policy Document No. 148, supra note 58, at 619.
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as a legal justification. Instead, these three permanent members
of the Security Council argued that the action was legally justi-
fied because it was taken pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 688.72 This resolution condemns Iraqi repression as a threat
to international peace and security,7 but no Security Council
resolution ever mentions the "no-fly" zones, and none authorizes
the use of force that those zones entail.
Resolution 688 merely appeals to all member states and hu-
manitarian organizations to contribute to humanitarian relief
efforts.74 It certainly does not amount to a Security Council au-
thorization of forcible humanitarian intervention. Nonetheless,
some find an authorization of the use of force in even this weak
language,75 and key members of the Security Council have treated
it as such.76 Nine years later, allied patrols are still destroying
Iraqi fixed-wing planes flying in these zones, as well as Iraqi
radar installations that threaten allied planes within the
zones.77 It strains credibility to argue that this continuing use of
force is justified by Resolution 688. Instead, the United States,
British, and French governments might have been better served
by invoking the concept of humanitarian intervention.78
72. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/688
(1991), reprinted in RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL (1946-1992), at 579 (Karel C. Wellens ed., 1993).
73. The resolution uses strong language in stating that the Security Council,
"[clondemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq,
including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which
threaten international peace and security in the region." Id. operative 1, at 580.
74. The closest Resolution 688 comes to authorizing any action by the allied pow-
ers to aid the Kurds is when it [a]ppeals to all Member States and to all humani-
tarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts." Id. operative
6, at 580 (emphasis omitted).
75. David Scheffer is among those who argue that Resolution 688 established "a
right to interfere on Iraqi territory for humanitarian purposes.&" David J. Scheffer,
Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and the New World Order, in RIGHT
V. MIGHT, supra note 34, at 145.
76. Soon after the resolution was adopted, British Prime Minister John Major
publicly expressed his humanitarian concern about the treatment of Iraqi Kurds. See
Craig R. Whitney, When Empires Fall, Not Everyone Emerges with a State of His
Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at E2. Following his lead, the United States and
France joined the United Kingdom in establishing "safe haven" zones of refuge for
the Kurds in northern Iraq. See id.
77. See U.S. Planes Strike AirDefense Sites in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at A6.
78. David Scheffer has recognized that "[i]ndeed the intervention was the right ac-
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The NATO countries have avoided specifics as to the legal
justification for the bombing on behalf of Kosovar Albanians, but
what little they have said is consistent with the cases discussed
immediately above in which other doctrines were invoked. Fol-
lowing the pattern of interventions such as those in East Paki-
stan, the rescue at Entebbe airport, and Tanzania's action to re-
move Idi Amin from power in Uganda, statements by some NATO
leaders seem to suggest that the operation might be justified
as a form of extended self-defense." NATO Secretary-General
Solana's suggestion that the NATO action was legal because it
was "within the logic of the U.N. Security Council" ° attempts,
as in the case of the Iraqi "no-fly" zones, to claim a multilateral
authorization by the Security Council where none actually existed.
What does this confusing body of state practice tell us about
the law of humanitarian intervention? Cross-cutting conclusions
can be drawn. This practice strongly suggests that no formal
right of humanitarian intervention has been recognized in the
Charter era. If states believed that international law recognized
such a right, surely they would have invoked it in at least one of
the cases referred to above. Conversely, the frequent practice of
what might be classified as humanitarian intervention, even in
the absence of a recognized right to do so, suggests the need for
a single legal doctrine that could distinguish between the best,
and the worst, cases of forcible humanitarian intervention.
D. Should a Constitutional Theory of Interpretation Apply?
One possible way to reconcile a right of humanitarian inter-
vention with the terms of the Charter is through a dynamic
"constitutional" approach to its interpretation. The U.N. Charter
tion but for the wrong reason. The Bush administration would have been more hon-
est if it had invoked the broad view of humanitarian intervention-controversial
though it may be ... ." Scheffer, supra note 75, at 146-47.
79. When Gerhard Schroder, the German chancellor, says NATO is ready "to de-
fend the common, basic values of freedom, democracy and human rights" and French
President Jaques Chirac describes the operation as one to defend "peace on our soil,
peace in Europe," they seem to be claiming implicitly that the bombing was an
action taken in self-defense. Castle & Brown, supra note 4, at 2.
80. March 25, 1999 Press Conference, supra note 2.
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is sometimes said to have a constitutional character, recognized
by Judge Alvarez's opinion in the Admission case. That opinion
refers to the U.N. Charter as "the constitution of the United
Nations" and as "the constitutional Charter.""' In one notable
passage, Judge Alvarez asserted:
The preparatory work on the constitution of the United Na-
tions Organization is of but little value. Moreover, the fact
should be stressed that an institution, once established, ac-
quires a life of its own, independent of the elements which
have given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance
with the views of those who created it, but in accordance with
the requirements of international life. 2
As this passage demonstrates, Judge Alvarez argued that, in
appropriate cases, the United Nations should be independent
and dynamic enough to transcend the original intention of the
states that founded it. Presumably, he considered this character-
istic to be exclusive to treaties constituting international insti-
tutions. His opinion makes no secret of his desire to see the
court become involved in the progressive development of inter-
national law,83 and in many ways it goes well beyond generally
accepted doctrines.' Nonetheless, the argument that constitu-
tive treaties should be interpreted in a somewhat special man-
ner is difficult to dismiss.
Judge Alvarez cited and built upon the U.S. Supreme Court's
well-known formulation of this idea in the 1920 case, Missouri v.
Holland.5 In Holland, Justice Holmes observed that "when we
81. Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admis-
sion of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 68, 70 (Mar. 3).
82. Id. at 68.
83. See id. at 67.
84. Judge Alvarez concluded that "the Constitutional Charter cannot be interpreted
according to strictly legal criterion; another and broader criterion must be employed
and room left, if need be, for political considerations." Id. at 70; see also id. at 69
(stating that "the traditionally juridical and individualistic conception of law is being
progressively superseded" by a international law that is not only juridical but also
"political, economic, social and psychological"). Judge Alvarez refers to this new law
as the "law of social interdependence," and this reference bears more than a passing
resemblance to the late Wolfgang Friedmann's "international law of co-operation."
FRIEDMANN, supra note 47, at 61-64.
85. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its beget-
ters."
86
Inis Claude, Jr., in his discussion of the constitutional prob-
lems of the United Nations, also focused on the need for consti-
tutions to develop and evolve in response to new realities. Mak-
ing careful use of the analogy between the U.S. Constitution and
the U.N. Charter, he concluded that "even though the problem of
constitutional relationships starts as a problem of interpretation,
it ends as a problem of development."" He continued by noting
that:
Sound constitutional interpretation, in international organi-
zation as in national government, balances insistence upon
the legally formulated consensus of the past, awareness of
the political configuration of the present, and consciousness
of the community's requirements and demands for the future.
This is not an easy stunt to perform in the United States,
and it is immensely more difficult in the United Nations.8
To some who reject the application of constitutional concepts
to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), it is the claim of
"flexibility" that is the most objectionable part of that approach.
The late Soviet jurist, G.I. Tunkin, for example, saw the consti-
tutional theory in political terms:
The basic idea of this theory, which is oriented toward Ameri-
can and English constitutional practice, is that the charters
of international organizations as constitutions are "flexible"
documents from whose provisions one may digress in prac-
tice, and this digression will not be a violation, but a modifi-
cation of these charters....
... There is no doubt whatever that the constitutional theory
is worked out and propagandized strenuously in the West be-
86. Id. at 433.
87. Ires L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 167 (Random House 4th ed. 1984) (1956).
88. Id. at 167-68.
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cause it is aimed at justifying the numerous violations of the
charters of general international organizations, and above all
of the United Nations, which did and do occur under the
pressure of the imperialist powers. Herein is the political
significance of this theory.89
Tunkin's viewpoint reflects both Soviet ideology and Soviet
resentment of the methods by which the U.N. Security Council
circumvented the Soviet veto during the Korean crisis. More
generally, it reflects the skepticism still shared by many states
concerning loose constitutional interpretation of the U.N. Char-
ter. Regardless of the approach taken in interpreting the Char-
ter, the NATO countries need to clarify their views on the law of
humanitarian intervention as it applies to actions such as Oper-
ation Allied Force.
Ill. THE NEED TO CLARIFY THE APPLICABLE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Danger of Invoking a Vague Doctrine Permitting the Use
of Force
As the preeminent global military power with the capacity to
veto any decision of the Security Council, the United States
could reject all legal restraints upon the use of force. To do so,
however, would not be in the interest of the United States."0
89. G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 322-23 (William E. Butler trans.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1974).
90. Indeed, Louis Henkin has argued:
I dismiss extreme hypothetical options for the United States. In theory,
the United States could decide that the law of the Charter has been a
mistake; that it is not viable; that one cannot subject the decisions of
governments on national security and vital interests to restraints by legal
norms; that it is undesirable-indeed, dangerous-to pretend that there is
law when in fact there is none. Or the United States might decide that
if the law on the use of force is not as it wishes it to be, it would prefer
no law on the subject. Or it might decide that the USSR has not in fact
been restrained by law and that it is therefore not in U.S. interests to
be so restrained.
Whatever some hard-nosed editorial writers may say, scuttling the
law of the Charter is not a viable policy for any U.S. government. Even
if the United States were persuaded that the law is wholly futile and
1709
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Certainly, the United States and its allies, as wealthy and pow-
erful states, have a lot to lose from instability and chaos in the
international system. Notwithstanding this fact, they have im-
plicitly endorsed a radical new doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention by deciding to use armed force to assist the Albanian
Kosovars. Applying a loose, flexible standard to the right of hu-
manitarian intervention might seem desirable from the humani-
tarian perspective because this could make it easier for nations
to act against violations of fundamental human rights around
the world. It would also be a double-edged sword. Indeed, the
danger that states might abuse a right of humanitarian inter-
vention is the strongest argument against too flexible a rule.91
Any doctrine that opens the door to legally sanctioned military
intervention on the territory of a state and against its govern-
ment has the potential to destabilize the entire international
system. A U.S. leadership role in clarifying and codifying the
legal rules applicable to such acts of intervention would serve
the interests of the United States in at least two ways. First, it
would help to avoid the possibility that a vague and opportunis-
tic policy of humanitarian intervention could easily be turned
against the interests of the United States in the future.9 2 Al-
deceptive, it would not be in U.S. interests to scrap it and, with it, the
fruits of the Second World War and the hopes, aspirations, and efforts of
half a century. Rejecting the Charter in effect would reject Nuremberg,
undermine our national justification in history, and reestablish Adolf
Hitler as no worse than anyone else. Such a move would be condemned
by the whole world. It would serve no good for the United States.
Henkin, supra note 36, at 57-58 (footnotes omitted).
91. "[Flexibility is not necessarily desirable with regard to unilateral humanitari-
an intervention because the primary concern is not the inability to act but rather
the fear of pretextual intervention." Michael L. Burton, Note, Legalizing the
Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral Humanitarian Interven-
tion, 85 GEO. L.J. 417, 420 (1996).
92. Burton's analysis suggests an objective, rather than subjective, approach for
formulating this policy:
Providing an objective standard against which to measure the legitimacy
of a given intervention would deter would-be aggressors and minimize
abuse in two respects. First, codification would impede states' ability to
assert humanitarian rationales for illegitimate intervention. Unlike a
subjective approach that judges the legitimacy of each case in an ad hoe
manner, codification enhances the international community's ability to
discern abuse, thereby making it more difficult for an intervening state
1710
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though armed intervention on the territory of the United States
may be unlikely for the moment, the United States could poten-
tially suffer from the adverse effects of unprincipled acts of in-
tervention in other countries. Second, giving definition to a real-
istic and modem standard of humanitarian intervention would
help to promote trust, friendly relations, and a more secure
future for all states. As a country dedicated to the rule of law, it
is also important for the United States to establish the legitimacy
of its actions in Kosovo. This will be difficult, if not impossible,
until the United States government endorses a clear formulation
defining, and thereby limiting, the right of humanitarian inter-
vention.
B. Historical Precedents: The U.S. Contribution to Codifying the
Laws of War and Peace
An examination of the nineteenth-century diplomatic practice
of the United States supports the view that this country should
lead the way in the codification of the laws of war and peace.
Both the Caroline incident" and the Alabama Claims arbitra-
tion9 are cases in which the United States and the United
Kingdom resolved disputes involving issues of sovereignty, na-
tional honor, and war by formulating a mutually agreeable codi-
fication of the applicable rules of international law. The Lieber
Code, formulated unilaterally by the U.S. Army in 1853, was the
first codification of the principles that ultimately became the
foundation of the law of armed conflict.
1. The Caroline Incident
The Caroline incident occurred in the winter of 1837 in the
midst of a crisis in Anglo-American relations. Despite numerous
attempts to settle the matter via treaties, joint commissions, and
arbitration, 95 there was still a lingering disagreement between
to characterize its action as a lawful humanitarian intervention.
Id. at 422-32 (footnotes omitted).
93. See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
95. These were established pursuant to the 1783 Jay Treaty and the 1814 Treaty
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the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the
northern boundary of the United States.96 Tensions persisted
along the border even in places where the boundary was undis-
puted. A band of insurgents opposed to the British government
in Canada had been using a ship known as the Caroline to move
men and supplies from the American side of the Niagara river to
an island they had occupied within British territory.97 British
forces attacked the Caroline one evening as it was moored for
the night on the U.S. side of the river.98 Several American citi-
zens were injured and one was killed before the attacking Brit-
ish force captured and destroyed the ship."
The United States government protested that the United
Kingdom had illegally used force against the territory and citi-
zens of the United States. °0 When the British finally ac-
knowledged the attack, however, they argued that it had been
justified as a legitimate act of self-defense. 1' The United States
strongly disagreed.0 2
The issue could not have been any more sensitive, more closely
linked to national security, or more tied to the sovereign dignity of
the states concerned. Furthermore, it is clear that both the United
States and the United Kingdom considered resolution of the dis-
of Ghent. See Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and the United States, Dec.
24, 1814, U.S.-Gr. Brit, 63 Consol. T.S. 421; Definitive Treaty of Peace Between
Great Britain and the United States, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 48 Consol. T.S.
487.
96. William I, the king of the Netherlands, and the mutually agreed arbitrator,
ruled as a matter of law in 1831 that the existing treaties between the parties were
insufficient to resolve their border dispute. He then asked the two countries to com-
promise. The idea of compromise was flatly rejected by the state of Maine and the
U.S. Senate. Secretary of State Daniel Webster was so troubled by the political im-
passe over this issue that he used federal funds to finance a propaganda campaign
in Maine to drum up support for territorial compromise. Even then, that policy was
controversial. See 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-
1843, at 29-30 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker et al. eds., U. Press of New Eng. 1983)
(1848) [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC PAPERS].
97. See id. at 30-31.
98. See id. at 31.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 32.
102. See id.
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pute to be of the highest importance.10 3 In an attempt to resolve
the dispute, the United States and Britain engaged in a long
exchange of diplomatic correspondence.' Much of this corre-
spondence is memorialized in the Diplomatic Papers of Daniel
Webster, who sent letters by or on behalf of the U.S. secretary of
state on this issue.10 5 The Diplomatic Papers also include re-
sponses received from the British foreign secretary's office.0 6
These letters set out each government's version of the facts sur-
rounding the Caroline incident and also include very specific
formulations by each government concerning the standards of
international law limiting recourse to the right to use armed
force in self-defense.
10 7
The two governments did not reach agreement as to all the
facts of the incident, and as a result they disagreed as to
whether Britain had violated international law.' They did
reach agreement, however, as to the applicable international
legal standard."9 The diplomatic correspondence through which
they reached this agreement constituted the first real codifica-
tion of the international law of self-defense.
The two governments agreed that "[riespect for the inviolable
character of the territory of independent nations is the most
essential foundation of civilization."" They were also in agree-
ment that nations had a right of self-defense, and that the exer-
cise of this right could, in appropriate cases, constitute a special
103. See id at 33-36 (reprinting letters by Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State,
and Edward Kent, British Foreign Secretary, that emphatically note the importance
of resolving the Caroline dispute).
104. See id. at 33-68 (reprinting the correspondence).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See i.
110. Letter from Lord Ashburton, British Minister, to Daniel Webster, U.. Secre-
tary of State (July 28, 1942), in DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, supra note 96, at 651-52. Lord
Ashburton stated further:
It is useless to strengthen a principle so generally acknowledged by any
appeal to authorities on international law, and you may be assured, Sir,
that Her Majesty's Government set the highest possible value on this
principle, and are sensible of their duty to support it by their conduct
and example for the maintenance of peace and order in the world. ...
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exception to the general rule of territorial inviolability."1 It fell
to the United States, as the aggrieved party, to stress the limits
applicable to the self-defense exception invoked by the United
Kingdom. It was in this context that Daniel Webster offered a
formulation of the law of self-defense that the United Kingdom
and the world ultimately accepted:
It is admitted that a just right of self-defence always attaches
to Nations, as well as to individuals, and is equally necessary
for the preservation of both. But the extent of this right is a
question to be judged of by the circumstances of each particu-
lar case; and when its alleged exercise has led to the com-
mission of hostile acts, within the territory of a Power at
peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can
afford ground of justification.
... Under these circumstances, and under those immedi-
ately connected with the transaction itself, it will be for Her
Majesty's Government to show ... a necessity of self-defence,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that
the local authorities of Canada,-even supposing the necessity
of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the
United States at all,--did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must
be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it." 2
Ultimately, the two governments resolved the diplomatic dis-
pute by adopting the legal standard set out above," 3 even
111. In his letter to Daniel Webster, Lord Ashburton further recognized: "'Self' de-
fence is the first law of our nature and it must be recognised by every code which
professes to regulate the condition and relations of man. Upon this modification, if I
may so call it, of the great general principle, we seem also to be agreed .... " Id.
at 652.
112. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Stephen Fox,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty (Apr. 24,
1841), in DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, supra note 96, at 58, 62, 67.
113. Daniel Webster noted this agreement in his reply to Lord Ashburton:
The President sees with pleasure that your Lordship fully admits those
great principles of public law, applicable to cases of this kind, which this
government has expressed; and that on your part, as on ours, respect for
the inviolable character of the territory of independent States is the most
essential foundation of civilization. And while it is admitted, on both
1714
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though they agreed to disagree as to the application of the law
to the facts of the case.1 4 The effect of this exchange of letters
has been profoundly significant; the formulation "has ever since
been accepted as the classic formulation of the right of self-
defense.1 5 Indeed, this case provides an outstanding example
of the positive role traditionally played by the United States
government in codifying the law of war and peace.
2. The Alabama Claims Arbitration
The second illustrative case occurred three decades after the
Caroline incident. Despite its declared neutrality with regard to
the Civil War, the United Kingdom allowed British ports to be
used to outfit ships of the Confederate Navy. The most notorious
sides, that there are exceptions to this rule, he is gratified to find that
your Lordship admits that such exceptions must come within the limita-
tions stated and the terms used in a former communication from this
Department to the British plenipotentiary here. Undoubtedly it is just,
that while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of
self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in
which the "necessity of self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton, British
Minister (Aug. 6, 1842), in DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, supra note 96, at 669.
114. Daniel Webster memorialized this agreement to disagree in the following man-
ner:
Understanding these principles alike, the difference between the two
Governments is only whether the facts in the case of the "Caroline"
make out a case of such necessity for the purpose of self-defence. Seeing
that the transaction is not recent, having happened in the time of one of
his predecessors; seeing that your Lordship, in the name of your Gov-
ernment, solemnly declares that no slight or disrespect was intended to
the sovereign authority of the United States; seeing that it is ac-
knowledged that, whether justifiable or not, there was yet a violation of
the territory of the United States, and that you are instructed to say
that your Government considers that as a most serious occurrence; see-
ing, finally, that it is now admitted that an explanation and apology for
this violation was due at the time, the President is content to receive
these acknowledgements and assurances in the conciliatory spirit which
marks your Lordships letter, and will make this subject, as a complaint
of violation of territory, the topic of no further discussion between the
two Governments.
Id. at 669-70.
115. FRIEDIMANN, supra note 47, at 256.
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example was the Confederate ship known as the Alabama,
which reportedly sank more than sixty Union ships before it was
finally destroyed. 116 After the Union won the Civil War, the U.S.
government understandably was anxious to hold the United
Kingdom accountable for what was widely perceived to be a very
serious violation of the international law of war and peace. More
surprising is the fact that the United Kingdom was willing both
to endorse a clear codification of the law applicable to the duties
of a neutral power towards belligerents and to submit the Ala-
bama claims to binding international arbitration. The 1871
Treaty of Washington between the United States and the United
Kingdom did exactly this."7
The sole purpose of the treaty was to settle, via international
arbitration, all U.S. claims against the United Kingdom based
on British support for the Alabama and other Confederate ships.
The treaty established a five-person Tribunal of Arbitration with
arbitrators named by the United States, the United Kingdom,
Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil." 8 The treaty also set out a clear
codification of the international law governing the duties of neu-
tral states in wartime." 9
116. See WILLiAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 327 (1990).
117. See Treaty Between Great Britain and the United States for the Amicable Set-
tlement of All Causes of Difference Between the Two Countries, May 8, 1871, U.S.-
Gr. Brit., 143 Consol. T.S. 145 [hereinafter 1871 Treaty of Washington].
118. The 1871 Treaty of Washington provided:
Now, in order to remove and adjust all complaints and claims on the
part of The United States, and to provide for the speedy settlement of
such claims, which are not admitted by Her Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment, the High Contracting Parties agree that all the said claims, grow-
ing out of acts committed by the aforesaid vessels, and generically known
as the Alabama claims, shall be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration to
be composed of 5 Arbitrators to be appointed in the following manner,
that is to say: one shall be named by Her Britannic Majesty; one shall
be named by the President of The United States; His Majesty the King
of Italy shall be requested to name one; the President of the Swiss Con-
federation shall be requested to name one; and His Majesty the Emperor
of Brazil shall be requested to name one.
1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 117, at 147 (Article I).
119. The following codification of law was set out in Article VI of the 1871 Treaty
of Washington:
In deciding the matters submitted to the Arbitrators they shall be gov-
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In their decision with regard to the Alabama, the arbitrators
concluded that two of the three agreed rules had been violated
and, with regard to the ship Florida, that all three of the rules
had been violated.121 The arbitrators awarded the United States
the then-staggering equivalent of $15,500,000 in gold.121 The
British government could not have been too surprised by this
verdict because it surely knew that it had violated the rules of
neutrality as formulated and agreed to in the Treaty of Wash-
ington. For instance, one unusual clause of the treaty sets out
the nuanced position of the United Kingdom on the issue of the
applicable law:
Her Britannic Majesty has commanded her High Commis-
sioners and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty's
Government cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a state-
ment of principles of international law which were in force at
erned by the following 3 rules, which are agreed upon by the High Con-
tracting Parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the case, and by
such principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the
Arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case:
RULES
A neutral Government is bound-
First. To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or
equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable
ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a
Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent
the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or
carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in
whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.
Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of
its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or
for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or
arms, or the recruitment of men.
Thirdly. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and,
as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the
foregoing obligations and duties.
Id. at 149 (Article IV).
120. "DECISION AND AWARD Made by the tribunal of arbitration constituted by
virtue of the first article of the treaty concluded at Washington the 8th of May,
1871, between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland." 1 JoHN BASSETr MOORE, HISTORY
AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES
HAS BEEN A PARTY 653, 656-57 (Wash., D.C., Gov't Printing Office 1898) (emphasis
omitted).
121. See id. at 658-59.
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the time when the claims mentioned in Article I arose, but
that Her Majesty's Government, in order to evince its desire
of strengthening the friendly relations between the two coun-
tries and of making satisfactory provision for the future,
agrees that, in deciding the questions between the two coun-
tries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators should as-
sume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act
upon the principles set forth in these rules.
122
By its own terms, the Treaty of Washington's codification of
the duties of a neutral state under international law set out
rules to be observed in the future, as well as a standard to be
applied to the past conduct of the United Kingdom."~ In this
sense, it was intended to be semi-legislative, as evidenced by the
treaty language stating that, "the High Contracting Parties
agree to observe these rules as between themselves in future,
and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers
and to invite them to accede to them."'
3. The U.S. Role in Codification of the Laws of War
From the very beginning, the United States has played a
crucial role in the codification and development of international
humanitarian law. 1 5 The Lieber Code, issued in 1863 as Instruc-
tions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, 6 was the first official attempt to codify the laws and
customs of war. Other countries adopted it almost immediately,
and it has influenced all subsequent developments in this area
of international law. 12 7 Theodor Meron attributes the tremen-
122. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 117, at 149 (Article IV).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber's Code and Principles of Humanity, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 269 (1997).
126. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jill Toman
eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
127. The impact of the Lieber Code was both immediate and profound:
[Tihe Lieber Code projected its influence far beyond the ranks of the
United States Army. In 1868 an international commission meeting in St.
Petersburg, Russia, applied the code's principle of military necessity to
1718
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dous impact of the Lieber Code to a combination of the Code's
high quality and timing, 128as well as to its foundation of broad
humanitarian principles. 29 Like the rules codified by the United
States in the Caroline incident and prior to the Alabama Claims
arbitration, the Lieber Code was a very conscientious attempt at
codification of universally applicable neutral principles. It was
not a political formulation designed primarily to promote the
self-interest of a single state.
Although it is the thesis of this Essay that the United States
should lead international efforts to codify the international law
of humanitarian intervention, there are ,reasons to hope that
other nations will participate. Because NATO as a whole ap-
proved the bombing of Yugoslavia, all of the NATO member
countries share responsibility for clarifying the international law
of humanitarian intervention. The United States bore the brunt
of the military burden in that bombing mission, and it is the
country most likely to lead missions of humanitarian interven-
tion in the foreseeable future. Awareness of this special role
could motivate U.S. policymakers to propose standards of hu-
manitarian intervention designed to leave the U.S. military
maximum leeway.130 This tendency could be counterbalanced if
ban the use of small-caliber explosive bullets because they would cause
"unnecessary suffering." In 1870 the Prussian Government adapted the
code as guidance for its army during the Franco-Prussian War. The code
also formed the basis of the Brussels Declaration of 1874, which in turn
influenced the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of 1899 and 1907, the foundation of the law of land warfare for the
entire twentieth century.
Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits
of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 215 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
128. Indeed Meron argues: "Both the Code's high quality and its timing, written
when no other significant compilations of laws and customs of war were available,
can explain its tremendous impact on the codification of international humanitarian
law." Meron, supra note 125, at 278.
129. Meron further noted: "Rather than any one technical or detailed rule, the
Lieber Code's foundation in broad humanitarian principles explains its tremendous
impact both on later multilateral treaties codifying the law of war and on the devel-
opment of customary law." Id. at 274.
130. This special role was stressed during the negotiation of the statute for a per-
manent International Criminal Court (ICC). Ambassador David Scheffer, the Clinton
Administration's special envoy dealing with war crimes, summed up the unique con-
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the NATO allies of the United States, some of whom have al-
ready stressed the need for codification, 13 1 play a prominent role
in that effort.13
2
Some of the best United States codification efforts were made
in conjunction with other western powers. Both the Caroline
incident and theAlabama Claims arbitration required the United
States to formulate its view of international law in the context
of a legal dispute with the United Kingdom. Each country was
cerns of the United States:
[Tihe reality is that the United States is a global military power and
presence . . . . Our military forces are often called upon to engage over-
seas in conflict situations, for purposes of humanitarian intervention, to
rescue hostages, to bring out American citizens from threatening environ-
ments, to deal with terrorists. We have to be extremely careful that this
proposal [for an ICC statute) does not limit the capacity of our armed
forces to legitimately operate internationally . .. that it does not open up
opportunities for endless frivolous complaints to be lodged against the
United States as a global military power.
Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painful Birth, N.Y. TImES, Aug.
13, 1997, at A1O.
131. According to recent reports, France played a key role in moderating the drift
towards more aggressive bombing of civilian targets during the NATO mission. As
Dana Priest of the Washington Post reported:
One of the myths of the war is that the leaders of NATO's 19 member
countries ran the air campaign by committee. But that is not the way
the decision-making looked to the alliance's generals and political leaders.
Inside the alliance, it was clear that the important choices-such as
whether to bomb targets that had a largely civilian character-were
made by the leaders of three countries: the United States, Britain and
France. And only one of them, France, regularly played the skeptic.
Dana Priest, Bombing by Committee; France Balked at NATO Targets, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 1999, at Al.
132. A brief Reuters wire report summarized the following concerns expressed by
the Italian Foreign Minister:
U.S. intervention in Kosovo compensated for Europe's lack of political and
military power, but NATO's action there raised questions about interna-
tional legality, the Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, remarked here
Monday... . Mr. Dini stressed that while the war had been fought for a
just cause, the NATO action raised questions about how to ensure inter-
national legality in the future, questions that Italy will put to the United
Nations next month.... [B]y intervening in the Balkans, NATO had
overridden the old diplomatic principle that sovereignty came first, but a
new code of practice and political discipline had yet to be established.
Italy Questions NATO in Kosovo, INTL HERALD TRIB., Aug. 24, 1999, at 5, available
in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File.
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obliged to make its legal case in terms acceptable to a formida-
ble rival. Even the Lieber Code, which the United States formu-
lated unilaterally, was in a sense a product of both the United
States and Europe. The Code built upon insights from philoso-
phers of the European Enlightenment, such as Rousseau, and
upon the European-born Lieber's experience as a combatant in
the Napoleonic wars.
No state can make its law binding upon the others, and this
fact complicates the task of codifying the law of humanitarian
intervention. The examples of the Caroline incident and the
Alabama Claims arbitration, however, demonstrate how good
faith efforts at codification can come to be accepted as setting
the standard for all states. These two codification efforts were
successful because they were fair and balanced, which made
them acceptable to the international community as a whole.
If the United States and its allies want other states to accept
and acknowledge a right of humanitarian intervention, they
must formulate a standard that is practical and true to princi-
ple.1" This should be done soon before others abuse this putative
right and offer a more troubling model of how it should work.
The formulation must be sufficiently definite to provide a work-
able legal standard and not merely a statement of political doc-
trine.1" Indeed, as the International Court of Justice has ob-
served, a rule or standard can gain status as part of customary
international law only if it is "of a fundamentally norm-creating
character."1 35
133. '[Ain intelligible standard.. . is essential to transforming humanitarian inter-
vention into an objective rule of international law, one capable of recognition and
enforcement." David J. Bederman, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law
and Morality, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 406, 408 (1989) (book review).
134. "IWlith respect to the terrible uses of force, it is important that, as far as
possible, rules not be subject to concealment and distortion of facts and circumstances
and to self-serving characterizations." Henkin, supra note 36, at 65.
135. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41-42 (Feb. 20).
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IV. THE ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL STANDARD FOR
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The specific conditions applicable to legal acts of humanitarian
intervention and the duties and responsibilities of the interven-
ing state have never been clarified. One aim of this Essay is to
identify some of the relevant principles. A few of these are spe-
cifically required to address the unique problems raised by hu-
manitarian intervention, while others are derived from the gen-
eral practice of states regarding the use of force. Taken together,
these principles must reconcile the shared global interests in
stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty with the occasional
need for intervention to prevent the most egregious violations of
fundamental human rights.
When the nation-state system emerged three hundred and
fifty years ago, the principle of state sovereignty was at its
core.13 6 Implicit in that sovereignty was the obligation of each
state to refrain from armed military intervention on the territory
of other states. From the start, this obligation was subject to
critical exceptions, including the right of self-defense, the right
of reprisal, and situations of declared war.' The exception most
universally accepted is the right of self-defense, which is subject
to its own conditions. 138 It therefore seems logical to assume that
a right of humanitarian intervention, were it to be recognized,
would at a minimum be subject, mutatis mutandis, to the general
conditions applicable to the right of self-defense. Thus, the con-
ditions of necessity and proportionality, which limit the right of
self-defense under customary international law, 13 must also
limit the right of humanitarian intervention under international
law. These principles have been most clearly defined in cases of
136. See Krishna Jayaker, Comment, Globalization and the Legitimacy of Interna-
tional Telecommunications Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 711, 717 (1998).
137. See David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 607, 613-15 (1995).
138. See id.
139. "The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of
necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law." On the Legal-
ity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8).
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self-defense or in the exercise of the right of reprisal, and they
must be adapted when applied to humanitarian intervention.
The U.N. Charter imposes a number of additional conditions
upon the exercise of the right of self-defense. These include the
requirement of a prior armed attack,' ° the extinction of that
right once the Security Council has taken measures to maintain
international peace and security,' and the requirement that
states report all acts of self-defense to the Security Council.'42
Some of these additional requirements may also be applicable to
the right of humanitarian intervention.
A. The Role of the Security Council
The U.N. Charter designates the Security Council as the body
with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security,' and therefore no discussion of humanitarian
intervention can be complete without considering the essential
role of this body. To the extent that the U.N. Charter anticipates
the need for humanitarian intervention, the matter falls within
the scope of the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter.' If the Security Council determines that acts of
140. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
141. See 1d.
142. The Charter's definition of the right to self-defense states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
143. Article 24(1) of the Charter provides that, "In order to ensure prompt and
effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
acts on their behalf." Id. art. 24, para. 1.
144. See id. art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
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genocide, crimes against humanity, or other massive violations
of human rights constitute a threat to international peace and
security, it has the power to authorize an armed response. 145 The
right of the Security Council to make this decision is rarely dis-
puted, although opinions vary about whether any particular
situation truly constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. 14 6 However, the issue of whether humanitarian inter-
vention can ever be legal without the authorization of the Secu-
rity Council is hotly disputed.
Certainly it would be preferable if the Security Council could
take full responsibility for humanitarian intervention whenever
it might be necessary. Unfortunately, states wielding the veto
privilege sometimes make it impossible for the Security Council
to act, even in cases of serious and widespread abuses.'47 Kosovo
was one such case. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda involved even
more serious abuses, but in that case the Security Council as a
whole lacked the political will to act. 48 The failure of the Security
Council to act in egregious cases such as these is the strongest
argument for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It demon-
strates the clear need for some alternative legal basis that could
justify action to prevent widespread and serious violations of the
most fundamental human rights.
Any of the Security Council's five permanent members may
veto decisions of the Security Council.' 49 Until the end of the
Cold War in the early 1990s, this veto power usually was suffi-
cient to eliminate the possibility of Security Council-sanctioned
use of force, whether for humanitarian intervention or for any
other purpose. The Security Council has reached a consensus on
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
145. See id. art. 42 (providing that action may be taken "by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security").
146. See Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of
Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLIUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 310-11
(1994).
147. See Adrienne C. Meisels, Special Agreements in the Post-Cold War Era:
Reality's Conflict with Legal Theory, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 236 (1995).
148. See John M. Goshko, Killings Elicit Shock, but No U.N. Action, WASH. POST,
July 23, 1996, at A13.
149. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
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a response to massive human rights violations on a number of
occasions over the past decade,"5 but it could not agree on an
effective strategy to protect the Albanian Kosovars."5 ' Despite
the evidence of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo and the failure of all
diplomatic efforts to provide a solution, Russia opposed any
move by the Security Council to intervene militarily.15 2 When
the Council is paralyzed in this way, it leaves the international
community in a difficult position.
The entire thrust of the international law of human rights as
it has developed over the past fifty years is to guarantee to indi-
viduals the fundamental human rights that were being violated
systematically in Kosovo before the NATO intervention. The
1948 Genocide Convention15 recognizes that racial, religious, or
ethnic groups, such as the Albanian Kosovars, have a right not
to be victimized by those who would deliberately eliminate the
group in whole or in part.1" The inability of the Security Council
150. For example, the Security Council reached consensus on the need to establish
the two international criminal tribunals as a response to reports of massive viola-
tions of human rights in the regions concerned. These responses, however, did not
involve the use of force. See United Nations: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994)
Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Seass., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994);
United Nations: Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribu-
nal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
151. See Jim Hoagland, Kosovo in Limbo, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1999, at A35.
152. See Justin Brown, Aiming NATO at Serb Advance, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR,
July 11, 1998, at 1.
153. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (The Proxmire Act), Nov.
4, 1988, art. 1, 102 Stat. 3045; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion].
154. The Genocide Convention defines the crime of genocide as follows:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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to act in Kosovo left even that minimal promise unfulfilled. The
Genocide Convention obligates signatory parties to "prevent and
punish" genocide.'55 Thus, even if the Security Council fails to
act, those parties are still subject to this general obligation. The
need to permit humanitarian action in extreme emergencies and
the role of the Security Council must therefore be reconciled.
As the discussion above illustrates, it is both anachronistic
and inadequate to maintain, even today, that the Security Coun-
cil veto trumps any possibility of intervention on behalf of hu-
man rights. On the other hand, it would be dangerous and
destabilizing for states to claim the right to intervene militarily
on the territory of other states without first bringing the matter
before the Security Council as the competent body.'56 Either
direct Security Council authorization for humanitarian interven-
tion or the failure of the Security Council to act upon reliable
reports of widespread atrocities should be a minimum legal re-
quirement for any armed humanitarian intervention.
B. The Requirements of Necessity and Legitimate Purpose
1. A Humanitarian Necessity Must Be Present
In the course of his correspondence with the United Kingdom
regarding the 1837 Caroline incident, Daniel Webster developed
the requirement of necessity, applicable to the right of self-de-
fense under international law.' The two countries ultimately
agreed to the following standard: "Under these circumstances,
and under those immediately connected with the transaction
itself, it will be for Her Majesty's Government to show.., a
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."15 8
Genocide Convention, supra note 153, art. 1.
155. "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish." Id.
156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
158. Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Stephen Fox, supra note 112, at 67.
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The Caroline standard of necessity applies only when the
security of a state is at issue.'59 As such, it cannot apply to hu-
manitarian intervention without some adaptation. However, the
need to prevent serious, widespread violations of human rights
in another state may be perceived as creating a similarly instant
and overwhelming necessity for action.
Defining necessity for purposes of humanitarian intervention
essentially is a matter of drawing the line between those human
rights violations serious enough to justify a response compromis-
ing state sovereignty and those that fall below this threshold.
Just as people can disagree about the relative importance of
human rights on the one hand and peace and stability in the
international system on the other, people might likewise dis-
agree as to the necessity of humanitarian intervention in any
given case. At a minimum, however, the human rights concerns
involved would need to be quite serious and widespread in order
to approach this critical threshold.
2. Pretextual Interventions Must Not Fall Within the Right
Perhaps the most compelling argument against recognizing a
right of humanitarian intervention is that it might be used as a
pretext for military intervention actually motivated by other,
less noble, objectives. 6 ' If international law is to recognize the
right of humanitarian intervention, it must incorporate appro-
priate standards to prevent pretextual abuse.16" ' The basic re-
quirement of necessity, as discussed above, is a beginning. For
159. See id.
160. As R.J. Vincent notes:
On policy, those who argue against the rightfulness of humanitarian
intervention are inclined to observe that it is a doctrine used by the
great against the small, that it smacks of imperialism, that it disguises
ignoble motives (or, conversely, that it expects too high a standard of
behaviour), that it might encourage counter-intervention, and that it is in
general heedless of consequences.
VINCENT, supra note 39, at 45.
161. See Barry M. Benjamin, Note, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing
the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 120,
122 (1992-93) (defining "pretextual interv;ention" as "a nation's use of military force
in a different state for the nation's own gain, not for the protection of human
rights").
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that test to be met, there must at least be some compelling
humanitarian objective.'62 Even if the requirement of necessity
is met, what begins as a case of humanitarian intervention could
become something entirely different if the intervening power
abuses the advantage it has gained from intervening. Indeed,
even Louis Henkin, who concludes that states have accepted a
limited right of humanitarian intervention, stresses that this
does not include the right "to topple a government or occupy
its territory even if that were necessary to terminate atroci-
ties .... 16
The practice of humanitarian intervention also threatens to
exacerbate inequality in the international system because the
stronger states are in a position to intervene on the territory of
relatively weaker states. These stronger states may hope to gain
territorial, military, political, or economic advantages while
claiming to act in the name of principle. Any legal definition of
humanitarian intervention must somehow address these con-
cerns.
164
Even in the best case scenario of humanitarian intervention,
an alternative interest, beyond purely humanitarian consider-
ations, is likely to exist. U.S. officials have been careful to stress
that it will be the policy of the United States to undertake hu-
manitarian intervention only when it is in its national interest.
This proposition is consistent with the widely held view that
states should always act in their self-interest. 6 ' The motives of
the intervening state are likely to be mixed, even in the best of
cases, and this is why the eventual legal standard must incorpo-
rate safeguards against abuse.
162. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
163. Henlin, supra note 36, at 42 (footnotes omitted). Henkin notes further that,
"Entebbe was acceptable, but the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam was not. The
U.S. invasion and occupation of Grenada, even if in fact designed to protect the lives
of U.S. nationals, also was widely challenged." Id. (footnotes omitted).
164. See Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention
in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INTL L. 547, 598
(1987) (arguing that establishing clear guidelines for humanitarian intervention
would minimize abuse).
165. See MORGENTHAU & THOMPSON, supra note 31, at 5, 10-11, 13 (arguing that
the only rational foreign policy for a state is one that maximizes the state's power).
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C. The Requirement of Proportionality
In addition to defining "necessity," the exchange of letters in
the Caroline incident also clarified that a requirement of propor-
tionality applies to the right to use force in self-defense.166 A
similar requirement necessarily must limit any right of humani-
tarian intervention under international law.16
The issue of proportionality as a limit upon the use of force in
international law has not been adjudicated often, but the arbi-
trators in the Naulilaa Arbitration considered it carefully.16 The
Naulilaa Arbitration concerned armed exchanges in southern
Africa during the period from 1914 to 1915.169 When a German
official and two German officers were killed at the Naulilaa
outpost in Portuguese-ruled Angola, German troops, following
orders from the governor of German-ruled Southwest Africa,
retaliated by attacking and destroying several Portuguese out-
posts.170 Germany claimed that the doctrine of reprisal justified
its actions.'7 ' The arbitrators concluded, on three separate
grounds, that the German response could not be justified as a
lawful act of reprisal.7" They found no prior illegal act commit-
ted by Portugal that would justify acts of reprisal, no formal
request by the Germans to achieve satisfaction of its claims by
legal means, and an unacceptable lack of proportion between the
166. In one of his correspondences in the Caroline incident, Daniel Webster wrote:
It will be for [the British Government] to show, also, that the local au-
thorities of Canada,--even supposing the necessity of the moment autho-
rized them to enter the territories of the United States at all,--did noth-
ing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.
Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Stephen Fox, supra note 112, at 67.
167. Although Louis Henkin expresses skepticism concerning humanitarian interven-
tion as a "formal" exception to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, he concludes that
"the legal community has widely accepted that the Charter does not prohibit human-
itarian intervention by use of force strictly limited to what is necessary to save
lives." Henkin, supra note 36, at 41.
168. See Naulilaa Arbitration (Port. v. F.R.G.), 2 R.IA.A. 1011 (1949).
169. See id. at 1014.
170. See id.
171. Reprisals are acts that would normally be illegal, but that may be legal as a
proportionate and necessary response to a prior illegal act. See id. at 1026.
172. See id. at 1028.
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alleged offense and the many brutal acts committed in re-
sponse.173
In discussing the issue of proportionality, the three Swiss
arbitrators began by endorsing a definition of "reprisal" that
directly incorporated the proportionality requirement. 74 They
observed that the "modern," circa 1928, tendency among publi-
cists was to omit this requirement as an element of reprisal. 75
Speaking of general international law at the end of the first
World War, they concluded that it "certainly tends to limit the
notion of legitimate reprisal and to prohibit excesses."'76
The Naulilaa decision noted that even the Germans conceded
that a proportionality requirement applied to acts of reprisals. 177
The decision suggested, however, that proportionality is a mat-
ter of general international law transcending the issue of repri-
sals. At one point the arbitrators observed that, "even if we were
to admit that the law of nations does not require that the repri-
sal must correspond approximately to the offense, one would
have to consider as excessive and therefore illicit, any reprisals
out of all proportion to the acts which motivated them."78
Whether we include the proportionality requirement as part of
the definition of humanitarian intervention or apply it as a gen-
eral principle of law governing the use of force, there can be
little doubt that it must apply to humanitarian intervention as
well as to the law of self-defense and reprisal.
173. Specifically, the arbitrators made the following finding.
The arbitrators therefore conclude that the German acts of aggression of
October, November and December 1914, at the border with Angola, can-
not be considered to be legitimate reprisals for the incident at Naulilaa
or for earlier acts of the Portuguese authorities, this due to the lack of a
sufficient cause, of a prior attempt to achieve legal satisfaction
("sommation"), and of an acceptable proportion between the alleged of-
fense and the reprisals carried out.
Id. (author's own translation from French).
174. See id. at 1026.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. "He who uses reprisals, does naught but to respond to an act contrary to the
law of nations by another act, thus it is evident that the harm caused by the second
must be proportionate to the harm caused by the first." Id. at 1028 n.1 (quoting the
German response).
178. Id. at 1028.
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D. The Duty to Respect International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights
Even if it can be established both that humanitarian interven-
tion can be legal without Security Council authorization, and
that the human rights situation in Kosovo was an event that
rendered armed intervention appropriate, the question still re-
mains as to whether the mission was carried out in a legal man-
ner. The answer to this question depends, in part, upon the
amount of force used and its relationship to the evils that the
intervention sought to remedy. This is the issue of proportion-
ality discussed above.'
Compliance by the intervenor with international humanitarian
law is a separate issue. All states are bound to respect inter-
national human rights and international humanitarian law, and
states invoking the right of humanitarian intervention are no
exception. Indeed, it could be argued that a state that elects to
use force to protect human rights should be held to an especially
high humanitarian standard during the course of that
operation.180 The principal issue of international humanitarian
law raised by the recent NATO military action against Yugosla-
via concerns collateral damage to civilians and their interests.
International humanitarian law has been evolving for over a
century, and only a few of its relevant details can be mentioned
here. First, it bans vicious acts, such as intentionally directing
attacks against civilians or civilian personnel, 1 ' and attacking
or bombarding towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings that are
undefended and are not military objectives."8 2 Second, and more
fundamentally, international humanitarian law requires states
to recognize a distinction between civilians and military targets
and to use weapons capable of distinguishing between them.181
179. See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
180. Cf infra text accompanying notes 197-98 (discussing the intervenor's respon-
sibility not to make the situation worse).
181. See ROME STATUTE, supra note 62, art. 8(2)(b)(2) (codifying this rule).
182. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, art. 25, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
183. According to the International Court of Justice:
The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of
humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection
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This second principle has an American pedigree because, like
much of international humanitarian law, it can be traced back to
the 1863 Lieber Code.'1 Perhaps the clearest expression of this
principle is found in Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which provides that, "[i]n order to ensure respect
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects,
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives."185
U.S. officials have suggested repeatedly that the foregoing
formulation reflects customary international law binding upon
the United States."8 6 Although the applicability of these prin-
of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinc-
tion between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make
civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons
that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.
According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary
suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons caus-
ing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In applica-
tion of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of
choice of means in the weapons they use.
On the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257
(July 8).
184. The Lieber Code formulated the principle of distinction in the following terms:
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so
has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction
between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the
hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more
and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in per-
son, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
Lieber Code, supra note 126, art. 22, at 7 (emphases added).
185. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 48, at 25, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1412 (emphases added) [hereinafter Protocol I].
186. The United States is not a party to Protocol I, but Horace Robertson, Jr. has
noted:
A number of statements, both official and unofficial, by spokesmen for
the United States Departments of State and Defense, spoken primarily in
the context of an examination of Additional Protocol I and the U.S. deci-
sion not to ratify it, have suggested that the U.S. regards the principles
of distinction and the military objective, as articulated in the Protocol, as
customary international law.
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military Objective in the Law of
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ciples is undisputed, their application hinges upon the highly
contentious question of what constitutes a legitimate "military
objective." Protocol I defines the military objective in very nar-
row terms, stating that such objectives must, by their "nature,
location, purpose or use," make an effective contribution to mili-
tary action, and that their total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization must, in the prevailing circumstances, offer a
definite military advantage.18 The military manuals of many
states incorporate this very standard, providing persuasive evi-
dence that it also is generally applicable as part of customary
international law.'88 This standard suggests that indeed there is
an issue as to whether the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was
consistent with international humanitarian law.'89
Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 197, 204 (Michael N. Schmitt
ed., 1998).
187. Protocol I, supra note 185, art. 52. The following complete definition of mili-
tary objective is set out in Protocol I:
Article 52.-General protection of civilian objects
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civil-
ian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in
paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as ob-
jects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutral-
ization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
of advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to
civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling
or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
Id. (emphases added).
188. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Robertson, supra note 186, at 204-
07 (citing the inclusion of Additional Protocol I in the military manuals of Germany,
Australia, Canada, and the United States).
189. As one commentator has noted:
By the end of the air campaign, Serb authorities reported at least 2,000
civilian deaths, with many thousands more injured. That is greater than
the number of Albanians killed in Kosovo in the months preceding the
air war. Serb forces committed many more murders under cover of the
air campaign, perhaps over 9,000. But deaths attributable to NATO
bombing are at least as many as the initial killing NATO intervened to
stop. It is hard to dismiss demands for international scrutiny of NATO
tactics as a mere propaganda ploy.
Jeremy Rabkin, A New World Order: The Clinton Doctrine Could Be Turned Against
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The Statute of the International Criminal Court formulates
these same principles in a slightly different form. It defines as a
crime the intentional launch of any attack with the knowledge
that the attack will cause collateral damage to civilians or civil-
ian objects that clearly would be excessive. 9 ° The standard of
what is excessive is to be determined in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 9 '
Applying this standard to the recent NATO bombing mission
raises many questions. For example, the command decision to
restrict the intervention in Yugoslavia to high-altitude bombing
must surely have raised the risk of collateral damage to civil-
ians. The issue is whether that additional risk was "excessive" in
relation to the military objective of minimizing NATO losses.
The issue is a difficult one, as evidenced by disagreements
among the NATO allies regarding the selection of appropriate
military targets within Serbia.'92
A workable standard of humanitarian intervention for the
future would ideally be built around even more specific rules in
this area. Indeed, when a state elects to intervene abroad for
humanitarian purposes, it should be held to a higher standard
regarding the risk of collateral damage to civilians. By the same
token, U.N. forces should also be held to a higher standard.
Oddly enough, the applicability of international humanitarian
law to U.N. military operations was at one time considered to be
a gray area of the law. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan re-
cently resolved doubts on this issue by issuing guidelines requir-
ing all U.N. troops to respect the rules established under the
basic instruments of international humanitarian law.'3 The idea
the U.S., AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 1999, at 50.
190. The Rome Statute defines the following crime as one subject to prosecution:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural envi-
ronment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated.
ROME STATUTE, supra note 62, art. 8(2)(b)(4) (emphases added).
191. See id.
192. According to reports in the Washington Post, even the NATO allies disagreed
about the appropriate line between military and civilian targets during the bombing
mission. See Priest, supra note 131, at Al.
193. According to the guidelines established by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
1734
20001 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT A CROSSROADS
that U.N. military forces could operate outside the reach of in-
ternational humanitarian law was based on the argument that
the United Nations itself is not party to any of the basic treaties
that establish international humanitarian law.l"4 This rather
implausible argument ignored the fact that the fundamental
rules of international humanitarian law are also binding as
customary international law. It is true that the United Nations
is not a state, but as the Secretary-General has now recognized,
it would be completely unacceptable for U.N. military forces to
violate fundamental principles of international humanitarian
law. Thus, if anything, it seems logical to hold both the United
Nations, and any state claiming an extraordinary right to use
force for humanitarian intervention, to a higher standard.
E. The Duty Not to Make the Humanitarian Situation Worse
than It Otherwise Would Have Been
Doubts about the net effect of humanitarian intervention form
one of the principal objections to the idea that it ought to be
tolerated legally.'95 To be viable, the legal standards of human-
itarian intervention must address this concern by holding the
intervening state responsible for not making the situation worse
than it would have been. Indeed, the statute of the International
Court of Justice authorizes the International Court of Justice to
consider general principles of law as a possible source of law.196
Consideration of the legal principles applied by states to the
as of August 12, 1999, U.N. "[mlilitary operations shall be directed only against
combatants and military objectives,' any attacks that could result in 'indiscriminate'
damage to civilians are prohibited, and 'Itihe right of the U.N. force to choose meth-
ods and means of combat is not unlimited." Farhan Haq, U.N. to Adhere to Geneva
Conventions, INTER PRESS SERv., Aug. 10, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
INPRES File.
194. See Barbara Crossette, Global Rules Now Apply to Peacekeepers, U.N. Chief
Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at A8.
195. R.J. Vincent notes that "we may expect among its members two general atti-
tudes towards the question of intervention .... The first is one of doubt about the
motives of interveners. The second is one of skepticism about any good outcome of
intervention." VINCENT, supra note 39, at 114.
196. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1(c) (visited
Apr. 2,2000) <http'J/www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasidocuments/ibasictexttibasicstatute.htm>
(identifying "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as a source
of international law).
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issue of aid to those in peril suggests that a state that elects to
intervene forcibly for humanitarian purposes has a duty not to
make the situation worse than it would have been without its
intercession.
In their internal law, states take two different approaches to
the responsibilities of the bystander witnessing an individual in
distress. In many civil law countries, such as Germany 197 or
France,19 the bystander has a duty to intervene and to assist if
he can do so without undue risk to himself or third parties. In
such cases, a failure to provide assistance is a punishable crimi-
nal act.'99 States, however, are under no such legal duty with
regard to humanitarian intervention. Under the common law
rule, as applied in the United States, a bystander has no duty to
provide aid.20 ° Once a bystander elects to become involved, how-
ever, he can be civilly liable if he makes the situation worse.20 1
197. According to the Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany:
Whoever fails to render assistance in case of accident, common danger or
emergency, although such assistance was needed and could have been
expected from him under the circumstances, especially since he could
have, rendered it without placing himself in significant danger and with-
out violating any important duties, shall be punished by up to one year's
imprisonment or by fine.
THE PENAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 323(c), at 231 (Joseph
J. Darby trans., The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No. 28, 1987).
198. See CODE PtNAL (French Penal Code) arts. 223-26, (visited Apr. 2, 2000)
<http'/Awww.rabenou.org/penal/L2.html>.
199. The French Penal Code provides for a sentence of up to 5 years imprisonment
for such a failure to provide assistance. See id.
200. The Supreme Court of Arizona succinctly articulated this common law prin-
ciple:
Since nonfeasance was not actionable except in certain special relation-
ships, the common law generally refused to impose a duty upon one
person to give aid to another, no matter how serious the peril to the
other and no matter how trifling the burden of coming to the rescue.
Thus, [a] defendant might with impunity sit on the wharf, smoke his
cigarette and refuse to throw his rope to a person drowning just below.
La Raia v. Arizona, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986). Prosser and Keeton articulated
this same principle the following way:
Because of this reluctance to countenance "nonfeasance" as a basis of lia-
bility, the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral
obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being
who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984).
201. See La Raia, 722 P.2d at 290 n.4 ("Even where the defendant is not re-
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The latter rule roughly corresponds to the situation of a state
electing, on its own authorization, to undertake forcible humani-
tarian intervention on the territory of another state.2 Such a
state is not under a duty to intervene, but once it has alffrma-
tively acted to do so, it must accept added legal responsibilities.
Some variant of this rule should apply to humanitarian inter-
vention. It is undoubtedly true that imposing such a responsi-
bility "operates as a real, and serious, deterrent to the giving of
needed aid."203 Such a deterrent would be needed, however, to
minimize the potentially destabilizing effects of recognizing a
right of humanitarian intervention.
F. Responsibility for Reconstruction
Since shortly after the bombing of Yugoslavia began, NATO
leaders acknowledged 2" that the military mission needed to be
supplemented with a program of aid and long-term investment
in the region." 5 Political as well as economic reconstruction will
sponsible for plaintiffs peril, when he assumes to act affirmatively... he assumes
a duty of reasonable care."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 200, at 378 ("If there is
no duty to go to the assistance of a person in diffculty or peril, there is at least a
duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse.").
202. When the Security Council has authorized the use of force under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, a different standard should apply. States using force pursuant
to Security Council authorization should not bear responsibility for the risk of in-
tervening in the first place.
203. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 200, at 378.
204. In a press conference held at the end of the NATO bombing campaign, British
Prime Minister Tony Blair used language suggesting NATO's moral, if not legal
responsibility for reconstruction:
We acknowledge our responsibility in relation to reconstruction .... Now,
we said all the way through that we would help them to reconstruct the
Balkans, to make the Balkans a place of peace and security within Eu-
rope in the future, not a region that's based on ethnic conflict. Our job is
to make sure that the promises that we made to them during the course
of the conflict we now honor post-conflict.
Remarks Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United King-
dom and an Exchange with Reporters in Cologne, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1132, 1134 (June 18, 1999).
205. At the same press conference, President Clinton endorsed reconstruction of the
Balkans by stating that "we have to give them a different tomorrow to work for. We
have to not only rebuild Kosovo, we've got to rebuild southeastern Europe in a way
that gives them the incentive to work together and to accommodate their differences."
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be sorely needed for years to come. Of course, by recognizing the
need for political and economic reconstruction, these officials did
not mean to suggest that humanitarian intervention entails a
legal responsibility for reconstruction, and there is little legal
basis for arguing that it does. The case for this aid has been
made in terms of the national interest of the intervening NATO
countries rather than in terms of legal obligation, but it is clear
that the NATO countries have assumed an expensive, long-term
commitment to the former Yugoslavia." 6
The future standard of humanitarian intervention might
maintain that such a responsibility exists from the start of any
humanitarian intervention.' 7 This standard would be consistent
with the general principle that any state invoking the right of
humanitarian intervention accepts additional responsibilities as
well as the obligation not to make things worse. It would also
discourage abuse of the right of humanitarian intervention.
The policy of refusing to provide aid for Serbia until Slobodan
Milosevic has been removed from power °' raises yet another set
Id. at 1133. This language is clearly political, building upon the idea that NATO
will be acting in its own interest in reconstructing the Balkans.
206. "[Plursuing a casualty-free war in order to sustain popular opinion still can
produce a heavy butcher's bill, and .. .military intervention, even for humanitarian
purposes, carries its own logic of long-term and expensive commitment." Robert E.
Hunter, Kosovo Has Changed the Rules of the Game; Europe: War Put NATO in the
Thick of the Balkans for the Long Term and Also Put Limits on the Alliance's Fu-
ture Sphere of Action, L.A. TIMS, July 7, 1999, at B7.
207. Kofi Annan argues that the entire international community must be committed
to reconstruction:
[When fighting stops, the international commitment to peace must be
just as strong as was the commitment to war. In this situation, too,
consistency is essential. Just as our commitment to humanitarian action
must be universal if it is to be legitimate, so our commitment to peace
cannot end as soon as there is a ceasefire. The aftermath of war requires
no less skill, no less sacrifice, no fewer resources than the war itself, if
lasting peace is to be secured.
Annan, supra note 21, at 50.
208. President Clinton described the U.S. policy on conditioning aid to Yugoslavia
in the following terms:
At his news conference Friday, Clinton also said Belgrade will get no aid
to repair NATO bomb damage if Milosevic's fellow Serbs continue to
endorse his effort to drive the ethnic Albanian majority out of Kosovo, a
province of Serbia. "I wouldn't give them one red cent for reconstruction,"
he declared.
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of legal issues. This policy attempts to influence the Yugoslav
political process and might itself be seen as a form of illegal in-
tervention.0 9 On the other hand, the logic of humanitarian inter-
vention might apply to justify the economic measures main-
tained against the Milosevic regime.2 10 If forcible humanitarian
intervention in Kosovo was justified, does this necessarily mean
that economic coercion against all of Yugoslavia is now justified,
even if necessary to remove the leaders responsible for the hu-
manitarian catastrophe? Ultimately, the law of humanitarian
intervention should develop answers to these difficult issues as
well as to others relating to the need for reconstruction.
CONCLUSION
The legal regime applicable to humanitarian intervention is
desperately in need of clarification. The NATO operation on
behalf of the Kosovar Albanians seems to represent a prima
facie violation of the U.N. Charter's rules on the use of force.
Yet, there are compelling moral, historical, and policy arguments
for the proposition that humanitarian intervention, subject to
the proper conditions, should be a special exception to those
rules.2 1
1
The Serbs are "going to have to come to grips with what Mr.
Milosevic ordered in Kosovo" and "they're going to have to get out of
denial."
"And then, they're going to have to decide whether they support his
leadership or not, whether they think its OK that all those tens of thou-
sands of people were killed. And all those hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple were run out of their homes and all those little girls were raped and
all those little boys were murdered," Clinton snapped.
"They're going to have to decide if they think that is OK."
Robert Burns, Clinton to Serbs: Rethink Milosevic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 26, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 17818097.
209. There is some disagreement as to whether purely economic acts can constitute
illegal intervention. For a discussion of these issues, see BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BAN: ISSUES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLICY 59-86 (1992).
210. See id. at 81-82.
211. Although he favors Security Council action, Kofi Annan endorses the idea that
a new international norm of humanitarian intervention is developing and that this is
indeed a good thing:
This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect
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It is far from clear that there was anything illegal about
NATO's Kosovo mission. Because of the underdeveloped state of
the law, however, it is also far from clear that the operation was
conducted in an entirely legal manner. This situation of legal in-
determinacy is troubling, destabilizing, and ultimately inimical to
U.S. interests. Even some NATO countries feel sufficiently threat-
ened by the "hegemony of a hyperpower"212 to have called for
strengthened international norms as a check upon U.S. power."
This reaction has not been limited to any one NATO country 4
and has been exacerbated by the impressive display of U.S. mili-
tary power in the course of the NATO mission.
As the world's last remaining superpower, it is inevitable that
the United States will face some resentment from other states.215
civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose pro-
found challenges to the international community. In some quarters it will
arouse distrust, skepticism, even hostility. But I believe on balance we
should welcome it. Why? Because, despite all the difficulties of putting it
into practice, it does show that humankind today is less willing than in
the past to tolerate suffering in its midst, and more willing to do some-
thing about it.
Annan, supra note 21, at 50.
212. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine described the United States as a
"'hyperpower' . . . 'a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories." To
Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower', INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, at 5, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, IHT File. He suggested that this domination could
best be resisted "[t]hrough steady and persevering work in favor of real
multilateralism against unilateralism, for balanced multipolarism against unipolarism,
for cultural diversity against uniformity." Id.
213. See Andrew Borowiec, France Seeks Big U.N. Role on Iraq; Urges Alternative
to 'Brutal Force', WASH. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at A14, available in 1998 WL
3466934.
214. The Prime Minister of Italy, Lamberto Dini, recently expressed his concern
that the precedent of Kosovo could strengthen U.S. hegemony:
[I]n referring to NATO's decision to unleash war in Kosovo against Yugo-
slavia without the approval of the United Nations, Italian foreign minis-
ter Lamberto Dini said Monday that NATO's self-investiture during the
war could not become a rule for the future. Speaking at a meeting on
friendship among the peoples held in Italy's resort town of Rimini, Dini
said, "the U.S. itself should be more clear of what it can and cannot do."
He said the defense of a right should be separated from "hegemonic
aspirations" in the future ....
Dini: Nato's Involvement in Kosovo War Not a Rule for the Future, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 23, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, All News Group File.
215. Indeed, a recent international reporter commented: "A great deal of lingering
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The lack of a clear legal standard limiting military intervention
in the future, however, can only add fuel to the fire. By moving
with its allies to formulate a principled codification of the law of
humanitarian intervention, the United States could allay fears
of "hyperpower hegemony," gain renewed respect for dedication
to the rule of law,216 and, most importantly, give hope of deliver-
ance to those in danger of extermination by a genocidal govern-
ment or faction.
anti-Americanism in Europe can be attributed to [an] inferiority complex." Dominique
Moisi, A Self-Confident Europe Is America's Best Partner, INVL HERALD TRIB., Jan.
16, 1999, at 8, available in 1999 WL 5109182.
216. In agreeing to a future international standard, the United States and its
NATO allies need not accept any additional legal responsibility for the Kosovo bomb-
ing. Following the example of the United Kingdom in the Alabama case, they could
acknowledge the need for a future standard and then agree to one without conceding
its retroactive applicability. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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